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LOVE AND THE LAW, CHILDREN AGAINST MOTHERS AND FATHERS: 
OR, WHAT’S LOVE GOT TO DO WITH IT? 
BENJAMIN SHMUELI* 
ABSTRACT 
Should there be a legally enforceable duty for a parent to raise his child in 
an atmosphere of warmth and love? Is it possible to use our current judicial 
system to judge a civil dispute between a parent and child based on failure to 
meet the duty of emotional care? And, if it is possible, should the legal process 
impose a positive duty on the parent to love his child, or should it confine itself 
to merely a negative duty for the parent not to emotionally neglect his child? 
These questions are not trivial in a world that, until recently, held the perception 
that the law should refrain from intervening in the family unit and allow the 
parent to retain his authority, rather than giving the child the right to file a claim 
against his parent for damages in general, and on the grounds of emotional 
neglect and lack of love in particular. 
This paper grapples with the question of whether parents should be required 
by law to act lovingly towards their children.  It will present several legal models 
which seek a balanced approach, perceiving the family as a separate sphere, 
where legal intervention in its affairs may cause more harm than good, but also 
perceiving the family as a collection of individuals whose disputes may be 
resolved within the framework of private law. This paper will show that the 
existing models are not balanced enough. Some prefer the sanctity, autonomy, 
and privacy of the family and therefore grant immunity to the parent from tort 
lawsuits brought by their children; some tend to the other extreme, and in practice 
almost negate any separate arrangement for the family unit; and some, which are 
more balanced, allow special arrangements in which the child can sue relying on 
ordinary legal mechanisms, are insufficient because they lack a clear legal 
declaration defining the rights of the child in general, and the right not be 
emotionally neglected in particular. One religious model presents a satisfactorily 
balanced solution, but it cannot be applied as is to modern secular law. 
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The proposed model tries to achieve true balance between the sanctity of the 
family and the needs of a child by bringing together tools from modern law and 
religious legal systems to result in a new and creative solution. 
This paper wrestles with many difficult topics within the realm of family 
law, among them: familial relations as reflected in civil law; justiciability of 
parent-child relations; the role of extra-judicial mediation or treatment within 
the legal process; children’s rights and the respect owed to the child; and the 
importance of recognizing the role of expressive law and its declarative function 
in cases when, on the one hand, it is very important to create the norm and grant 
the right, but on the other hand, it is not so appropriate due to the nature of 
familial relations to enforce it in daily life. 
Emotional neglect serves as a test case for examining tort lawsuits against 
parents in general. The proposals in this paper are also relevant in non-tort cases 
of civil claims brought by children against their parents, not just claims for 
emotional neglect. 
* * * 
I.   PRESENTATION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL DILEMMA: RECOGNITION OF A TORT LAW 
SUIT BY A CHILD AGAINST A PARENT ON THE GROUNDS OF EMOTIONAL NEGLECT OR 
LACK OF LOVE 
A parent’s love for his child is a precious feature of natural law, since 
society expects and encourages parents to protect, nurture, and safeguard their 
children.1 Natural law dictates that a child will grow in his father and mother’s 
home, that they will love him, feed him, and educate him until he reaches his 
majority. The parents’ love sometimes takes formal legal attire, too2 – 
particularly, the law should intervene when the parents do not provide these 
basic necessities to their child. 
The song “Jeremy” tells of a boy who is aggressive in school because 
“[d]addy didn’t give attention to the fact that mommy didn’t care.”3 The parent 
emotionally neglects his child, meaning that he displays a lack of involvement in 
the life of his child, does not participate in his process of growth, and in extreme 
cases is even alienated from the child and ignores him completely. Maas and 
Engler have given children who have suffered emotional neglect the harsh yet 
apt name “orphans of the living.”4 
Is it indeed the function of state law to intervene and follow in the steps of 
natural law by holding that the parent’s duty to raise his child in an atmosphere 
of warmth and love must be accorded enforceable legal status? Is it even 
possible to judge a civil dispute between a parent and child based on failure to 
meet the duty of emotional care using the normal tools of law that are available 
to us? And, if so, should the law impose a positive duty on the parent to love his 
 
 1. G. Steven Neeley, The Psychological and Emotional Abuse of Children: Suing Parents in Tort for 
the Infliction of Emotional Distress, 27 N. KY. L. REV. 689, 711 (2000). 
 2. CA 3798/94 A v. B [1996] IsrSC 50(3) 133, 141. 
 3. PEARL JAM, Jeremy, on TEN (Epic Records 1992). 
 4. HENRY S. MAAS & RICHARD E. ENGLER, CHILDREN IN NEED OF PARENTS 380 (1959). See also 
Steven D. Guynn, Compensation for ‘Orphans of the Living’, 18 J. FAMILY LAW 501 (1978-9). 
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child, or should it confine itself to a negative duty which imposes liability on the 
parent for emotional neglect?5 
This paper attempts to answer these questions, particularly the 
fundamental dilemma which underlies them all—what judicial policy should be 
adopted regarding the nature and scope of legal intervention in the family in 
general, and in parent-child relations in particular? Emotional neglect serves as 
a test case for examining tort lawsuits against parents in general. 
There are currently several potential models for legal intervention designed 
to resolve the fundamental dilemma. This paper will consider the advantages 
and disadvantages of each and conclude by proposing a new model which 
draws elements from secular and religious legal systems. This model creates a 
delicate balance between the family-collective-communitarian approach, which 
is concerned with the question of what is good for the family as a whole, and the 
individualistic approach, which focuses on realizing the right of the individual, 
whether adult or child, to bring a tort case. In other words, I shall attempt to 
draw a balance between an approach which perceives the family as a separate 
sphere, where legal intervention in its affairs may cause more harm than good, 
and an approach which perceives the family as a collection of individuals whose 
disputes must be resolved within the framework of private law. 
While one might suppose that only two legal models are possible, a model 
of sweeping intervention in parent-child relations or a model of minimal 
intervention, reality has shown that the legal situation is much more complex. 
The law has shaped additional models by giving differing weight to 
considerations for and against claims of emotional neglect. These considerations 
will be presented in Part II of this paper. In Parts III through VI, I will present 
the four prevailing models: (1) the minimal intervention model, based on Roman 
law and Old American law, under which the claim will always be barred; (2) the 
moderate legal intervention model, which prevails in most US jurisdictions, enables 
the family unit to enjoy a certain autonomy by affording the parent special 
defenses—but not complete immunity—against civil claims brought by his child 
against him; (3) the stringent-sweeping intervention legal model, present in Israeli 
law, which enables a child to sue his parents, even for emotional neglect; and (4) 
the soft-sweeping intervention legal model, rooted in Jewish law, which is a 
religious extra-territorial law that imposes a positive duty on the parent to love 
his child, but enforces this duty only moderately. 
None of these existing models is sufficiently compatible with 21st century 
laws. Accordingly, in Part VII, I will propose a new model: the integrated model 
for resolving the fundamental dilemma. This model seeks to integrate the 
advantages of each of the existing models while eliminating their disadvantages, 
 
 5. For different proposals regarding the definition of the term, some of which deal with the input 
(the emotional neglect), some of which deal with the outcome (the emotional damage), and some of 
which combine the two, see Ira S .Lourie & Lorraine Stefano, On Defining Emotional Neglect, 2 NAT’L 
CONFERENCE ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 201, 203 (1978); Jeanne M. Giovannoni, Definitional Issues 
in Child Maltreatment, in CHILD MALTREATMENT: THEORY AND RESEARCH ON CAUSES AND 
CONSEQUENCES OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT (Dante Cicchetti & Vicki Carlson eds.,1989); Rebecca L. 
Hegar & Jeffrey J. Yungman, Towards a Causal Typology of Child Neglect, 11 CHILD & YOUTH SERVICES 
REV. 203-20 (1989); Ruth Lawrence-Karski, United States: California's Reporting System, in COMBATTING 
CHILD ABUSE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES AND TRENDS 9-37 (Neil Gilbert ed., 1997). 
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in attempting to find an intermediate approach which is not overly sweeping 
but also not minimal. The proposed model will also work to integrate principles 
of secular and religious law. 
Note that if the plaintiff is no longer living with his parents, or if he is no 
longer a minor, there is no problem with forcing his parents to pay him 
compensation. If the child remains a ward of his parents, technically the court 
may order that the damages be kept in a trust fund for deposit in a long-term 
savings plan which is off-limits to family members and which the minor can 
open when he turns eighteen. Of course, there would still possibly be serious 
issues resulting from the fact that the child still lives with his parents, and I 
address these issues below. 
This paper deals with a number of important issues, among them: familial 
relations as reflected in civil law; justiciability of parent-child relations; the role 
of extra-judicial means of mediation or treatment within the legal process; the 
importance of children’s rights, including the granting of respect to the child; 
and the importance of recognizing the role of expressive law and its declarative 
function in cases when, on the one hand, it is very important to create the norm 
and grant the right, but, on the other hand, it is not so appropriate, due to the 
nature of familial relations, to enforce it in daily life. 
II.  CONSIDERATIONS FOR AND AGAINST RECOGNITION OF A CIVIL CLAIM AGAINST 
PARENTS 
Deciding whether or not to recognize children’s civil claims in general, and 
claims of emotional neglect in particular, against their parents relies upon 
various considerations, some legal and others social. A claim of this type can 
certainly be adjudicated from a normative point of view, but the question is 
whether it would be more appropriate to leave such claims outside the ambit of 
legal intervention. 
There are two main approaches to this issue which often contradict each 
other, the individualistic approach and the family approach (which is derived from 
the collectivistic-communitarian approach). According to the individualistic 
approach, the individual is autonomous and separate from the group to which 
he belongs. Accordingly, every person in the family unit is perceived as an 
individual, with the right to file a claim against a tortfeasor who has wronged 
him, even if the latter is a parent. 6 
In contrast, the family approach acknowledges the unique nature of 
families and allows them to conduct themselves as self-contained units, without 
legal intervention into their affairs, autonomy, or privacy. This approach focuses 
 
 6. For a discussion of these approaches in different situations see C. Harry Hui, Measurement of 
Individualism-Collectivism, 22 J. OF RES. PERSONALITY 17 (1988); Martha Minow and Mary Lyndon 
Shanley, Relational Rights and Responsibilities: Revisioning the Family in Liberal Political Theory and Law, 
11 HYPATIA 4, 5-6 (1996) (reprinted as Martha Minow & Mary Lyndon Shanley, Revisioning the 
Family: Relational Rights and Responsibilities, in RECONSTRUCTING POLITICAL THEORY: FEMINIST 
PERSPECTIVES 84 (Mary Lyndon Shanley & Uma Narayan eds., 1997)); Benjamin Shmueli, Who’s 
Afraid of Banning Corporal Punishment? A Comparative View on Current and Desirable Models, 26 PENN 
ST. INT’L L. REV. 57, 61-66 (2007) [hereinafter Shmueli, Corporal Punishment]; Sandra L. Haley, 
Comment, The Parental Tort Immunity Doctrine: Is It A Defensible Defense?, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 575, 579 
(1996). 
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on the collective,7 and for this paper’s purposes, on the family unit, taking a 
fairly paternalistic view of what is in the best interests of the unit. This approach 
sees the possibility of reinstating harmony in the family unit, as well as 
respecting its sanctity and privacy, as supreme values that might be impaired by 
legal intervention.  The family unit is therefore a separate sphere that cannot be 
interfered with and, on occasion, the rights of the individual harmed by a tort 
must be pushed aside in favor of the interest of the family, which possesses 
interests as an independent body.8 Treating the family as a unit with its own 
special rights has been heavily criticized for causing harm to the vulnerable 
members of the family, mainly women and children.9 Treating the family as a 
unit enables that unit to hide a multitude of wrongs because it grants power to 
the strong members over the weak members.10 Thus, children’s rights are the 
first to be harmed by the family approach. 
On the other hand, recognizing the rights of individual family members 
against each other does not seem to fit the family setting, where family members 
are believed to share some sense of collectivity, a sense “that ‘we’ exist as 
something beyond ‘you’ and ‘me.’”11 Communitarian theorists have argued that 
using the language of rights, which focuses on the personal interests of the 
individual family members, is not suitable for family life and might harm the 
sense of collectivity, as well as the intimacy and loving relationships that should 
be an integral part of every family.12 A common response to this critique is that 
individual rights between family members are necessary in the unhappy event 
of a breakdown of the relationship, or if the family fails to perform its protective 
and nurturing role (such as in the cases of abuse or neglect).13 This critique is 
accurate only if the family is broken and no harmony can be restored to it. 
 
 7. Hui, supra note 6; Ron Shor, The Significance of Religion in Advancing a Culturally Sensitive 
Approach towards Child Maltreatment, 79 FAMILIES IN SOCIETY 400 (1998). 
 8. The issue of “the private is the public” has been discussed intensively in the feminist 
discourse concerning the rights of women and children. See e.g., Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the 
Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983) [hereinafter Olsen, The 
Family and the Market]; Frances Olsen, Children's Rights: Some Feminist Approaches to the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, 6 INT’L J. L. POL’Y & FAM. 192, 194-95, 208 (1992); Hilary Lim & 
Jeremy Roche, Feminism and Children’s Rights, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON CHILD LAW 227 (Jo 
Bridgeman & Daniel Monk eds., 2000); Michael Freeman, Feminism and Child Law, in FEMINIST 
PERSPECTIVES ON CHILD LAW 19, 20 (Jo Bridgeman & Daniel Monk eds., 2000). 
 9. See e.g., Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, The Dark Side of Family Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1247 (1999); David J. Herring, Exploring the Political Roles of the Family: Justifications for Permanency 
Planning for Children, 26 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 183, 243 (1995). 
 10. Woodhouse, supra note 9, at 1252, 1254. 
 11. Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L. J. 624, 629 (1980). 
 12. MARY A. GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 123 (1991) 
(criticizing the American discourse of rights that shifts the image of familial relationships from a 
community of interests to an alliance of independent individuals); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM 
AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 33-34, 169 (2nd ed. 1998) (arguing that in the moderately ideal family 
situation, members of the family interact in a spirit of generosity, with genuine affection. Appeal to 
the rights of the individual members is seldom made in this situation, not because injustice is 
rampant, but because appeal to such rights is pre-empted by a spirit of generosity in which the 
family members are rarely inclined to demand their perceived rights or their fair share). 
 13. See e.g., Jeremy Waldron, When Justice Replaces Affection: The Need for Rights, in LIBERAL 
RIGHTS: COLLECTED PAPERS 1981-1991, 370 (1993); Elizabeth Kiss, Alchemy or Fool’s Gold? Assessing 
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The central considerations for and against recognizing a child’s civil claim 
against his parent derives from these two approaches.14 
A.  The Considerations Favoring Recognition of the Child’s Claim: 
1. Recognition of rights for the child and justice and equality before the law. This 
is the primary consideration in favor of recognition of the child’s claim against 
his parent. According to the individualistic approach, the child is an 
independent and autonomous person, with the same vested rights as any 
human being. These rights are separate from those of his parents, and include 
the right to make independent decisions with regards to his fate. Accordingly, 
the child has the right to decide whether to bring a tort claim against any 
person, including his parents. The fact that such a claim might be contrary to his 
benefit and the benefit of the family unit – or even might harm other members of 
the family unit – does not negate that intrinsic right. 
The basis for this viewpoint is justice and equality. Why should a child who 
has been wronged be deprived of his rights merely because the wrongdoer is his 
parent? On the contrary, perhaps in such cases tort claims should not only be 
recognized, but even encouraged, because the parent has a greater responsibility 
to his child than most human beings have towards each other. 
This approach seeks to achieve equality between the parent, who is regarded 
as physically, economically, and socially strong, and the child, who is considered 
much weaker, even if this imposed equality impairs the rights and authority of the 
parent.15 The parent is not always cognizant of the injustice caused to the child by 
 
Feminist Doubts About Rights, in RECONSTRUCTING POLITICAL THEORY: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 1 (Mary 
Lyndon Shanley & Uma Narayan eds., 1997). 
 14. For further discussion regarding some of the considerations see Neeley, supra note 1; Eric T. 
Lanham, Suing Parents in Tort for Child Abuse: A New Role for the Court Appointed Guardian Ad Litem?, 
61 UMKC L. REV. 101 (1992); Reid H. Hamilton, Defining the Parent's Duty after Rejection of Parent-
Child Immunity: Parental Liability for Emotional Injury to Abandoned Children, 33 VAND. LAW REV. 775, 
778 (1980); Judith G. McMullen, Privacy, Family Autonomy, and the Maltreated Child, 75 MARQ. L. REV. 
569, 589-98 (1992); Leonard Karp & Cheryl L. Karp, Beyond the Normal Ebb and Flow...Infliction of 
Emotional Distress in Domestic Violence Cases, 28 FAM. L.Q. 389 (1994). 
 15. The issue can be examined from the perspective of equality which arises from the 
philosophical and moral approach taken by John Rawls. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 
(Harvard University Press 1999) (1971) (assuming that there are fundamental freedoms to which every 
individual is entitled in equal measure and to the maximum extent. In Rawls’ opinion it is permitted to 
derogate from these freedoms in two principal areas: to preserve freedom generally, and to preserve 
the freedom of weaker persons, those who from the start enjoy less freedom. Rawls perceives justice in 
the sense of fairness, and explains that every individual in society must assume that he himself may, 
one day, belong to that weaker group (from an economic or social point of view, etc.). Utilitarian justice 
ignores the rights of minority groups and freedom of the individual in such a regime is secondary in 
importance compared to the interest of the majority. In contrast, justice which relies on fairness takes 
care of the weak. It is possible to extrapolate from this theory and assert the need to equate the position 
of the child (as a weak party) to that of the adult and allow him equal opportunities in different areas of 
life, even if, in practice, this may lead to a derogation of the freedom of the stronger party – the parent.); 
see also Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., U.N. Doc. 
A/44/49 (1989) [hereinafter UNCRC] (taking into account the rights of the child according to his 
evolving capacities, although there is a mixture in the Articles between children’s rights and the best 
interests of the child, and UNCRC does not expressly deal with tort claims of children against their 
parents. Another doctrine to be dealt with infra). For the emergence of children’s rights see LEGAL 
RIGHTS OF CHILDREN (Robert M. Horowitz & Howard A. Davidson, eds., 1984); John Eekelaar, The 
Shmueli_cpcxns.doc 5/5/2010  1:54:21 PM 
 LOVE AND THE LAW, CHILDREN AGAINST MOTHERS AND FATHERS 137 
his acts, and his lessened sensitivity stems from the disparity in their level of 
power.16 Children make up the most vulnerable sector of society, and naturally 
they have limited access to the legal system.17 On occasion, a parent will cause 
permanent damage to the physical and mental development of his child, which 
amounts to a betrayal and a severe breach of the child’s trust. The individualistic 
approach gives effect to the right of the child to sue and recover damages for the 
harm done to him, thus attaining a position of power vis-à-vis his neglectful 
parent.18 According to this approach, even if one were to accept the principle that 
the family unit possesses a certain autonomy, the strong individuals in the 
family—the parents—must know that there is a limit to the harm they can do to 
their children.19 
Feminist theories, too, are based on the premise of equality and justice, and 
assert that recognition should be given to a child’s civil claim against his parent.20 
 
Emergence of Children’s Rights, 6 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 161 (1986); Michael D.A. Freeman, Taking 
Children's Rights Seriously, 6 INT’L J. L. POL’Y & FAM. 52 (1992); Eugeen Verhellen, Changes in the Images of 
the Child, in THE IDEOLOGIES OF CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 80 (Michael Freeman & Philip Veerman eds., 1992) 
(presenting different approaches as to children’s rights); JOHN CALDWELL HOLT, ESCAPE FROM 
CHILDHOOD (1974) (holding a radical approach and suggesting that children be given the maximum 
possible rights); Bruce C. Hafen, Children’s Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some Reservations about 
Abandoning Youth to Their “Rights”, 3 BYU L. REV. 605 (1976) (raising fear arising from granting full 
rights for children); Michael D. A. Freeman, Introduction: Rights, Ideology and Children, in THE IDEOLOGIES 
OF CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 4, 42 (Michael Freeman & Philip Veerman eds., 1992) (presenting an 
intermediate approach that he labels “liberal paternalism”); LEON SHASKOLSKY SHELEFF, GENERATIONS 
APART: ADULT HOSTILITY TO YOUTH (1981) (examining the relationship between parents and children 
against the background of inequality, looking at it from a different angle, which stems from the 
assertion that there is a natural parental animosity towards the child and perpetual intergenerational 
tension which creates what he calls “the intergenerational conflict.” It is easier to link Sheleff’s approach 
with principles of equality because it refers to mutual feelings of hostility, and the relations are 
symmetrical, albeit only on the face of it. In an unequal system such as the tense family unit, the 
stronger will overpower the weaker and the asymmetry will become manifest, particularly when a 
parent is confronting his child. In other words, the parent’s hostility towards the child will override and 
dominate the relationship); Benjamin Shmueli, What Has Feminism got to do with Children’s Rights? A 
Case Study of a Ban on Corporal Punishment, 22 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 177 (2007) [hereinafter Shmueli, 
Feminism] (discussing the development of these points and the link between feminism and the rights of 
a child). 
 16. Cf. Morton Deutsch, Justice and Conflict, in THE HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION: 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 43, 46-56 (Morton Deutsch & Peter T. Coleman eds., 2d ed. 2006) (explaining 
that on occasion only an external observer can discern the existence of a victim and wrongdoer, a 
situation which perpetuates injustice, as one or both of the parties are unaware of the wrongness of 
their own situation or behavior. Injustice in the case of a wrongdoer and victim can take the form of 
distributive injustice, procedural injustice, or retributive injustice. Distributive injustice is assisted by 
the consequential test. Thus, for example, in the situation discussed in this paper, emotional neglect 
means that the child did not receive his fair or equal “portion”). 
 17. Neeley, supra note 1, at 710. 
 18. Id. at 711. 
 19. See DEUTSCH & COLEMAN, supra note 16 (this idea is derived from their look at the decision-
making process of the wrongdoer. For this paper's purposes, this process made by the parent was 
unfair, and therefore the child was caused an injustice by the actual decision-making process.). 
 20. Different feminist theories call for more state intervention in the family for the sake of 
equality and abolishing discrepancies, and to perpetuate the division of power in the family between 
parents and children (and not only between men and women), even in cases where the weak victim 
might be harmed. See Olsen, The Family and the Market, supra note 8, at 1497-1527; Shmueli, Feminism, 
supra note 15. 
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Accordingly, when weighing the child’s right of action against the harm to a 
parent compelled to compensate his child, the former should take precedence. 
2. A matter which is not “justiciable” invites the dominant party in the family to 
act as he wills. In most cases, the balance of power in the family unit points to a 
strong, authoritarian parent and a comparatively weak child. In the view of 
Francis Olsen, society today expects the courts to confirm the traditional social 
function of the parents as imposers of discipline. Most people would think the 
law was intervening too much in the life of the family if it allowed a child to sue 
his parents for being sent to his room as a punishment, even though a similar act 
if committed by a stranger would be considered a prohibited deprivation of the 
child’s freedom – false imprisonment.21 Olsen points out that failure to enact 
civil statutes governing the family unit beyond those already in place, such as 
those allowing the child to protect himself against his parent or even to sue him, 
may create a type of internal contradiction and disharmony. The state refrains 
from recognizing intrafamilial civil claims, while simultaneously enforcing 
criminal law within the family by enacting criminal statutes, sometimes for the 
very same acts.22 Accordingly, Olsen argues, the concept that everything is 
justiciable should also, and perhaps in particular, be applied to the family unit. 
3. Recognition of the claim is compatible with the general objectives of tort law, 
which include compensation, corrective justice, distributive justice, and 
deterrence.23 Were a court to refuse to hear a wronged child’s claim, he would 
be left without compensation for his damages – an unjust legal outcome which is 
also undesirable because it fails to deter both that child’s parent and others from 
engaging in harmful parental conduct. From an economic perspective, failing to 
hold a tortfeasor liable for his actions may be contrary to society’s aggregate 
welfare, since in the future society may be forced to pay for the physical and 
mental treatment of the injured. The wrongdoing parent who neglects his child 
is the best and cheapest avoider of the damage,24 and in many cases he is the 
sole avoider of the loss. Classic corrective justice only takes into account the 
parties to the dispute; others, such as the rest of the family, are not taken into 
account.25 
4. Monetary compensation has a psychological, symbolic, and educational impact. 
In practice, a compensation award proclaims the invalidity of the parental act26 
and helps the child begin to heal from the harm the parental act caused. In 
addition, public acknowledgement of the victim’s right to compensation is 
important from an educational point of view. A parent who has neglected his 
 
 21. Olsen, The Family and the Market, supra note 8, at 1505-06. 
 22. Id. at 1523. 
 23. See e.g., Glanville L. Williams, The Aims of the Law of Torts, CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 137-76 
(George E. Keeton & Georg Schwarzenberger, eds., vol. 4, 1951); IZHAK ENGLARD, THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
TORT LAW 7-20 (1993); DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 12-25 (2000). 
 24.  See Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test of Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 
1055 (1972) (approaching strict liability from an economic perspective). 
 25. See, e.g., Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 403 (1992). 
 26. Neeley, supra note 1, at 711-13. 
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child violates not only the trust of the child, but also of society. Therefore, 
society should arrange a system in which the parent may be held liable for his 
tortious acts against his child. 
5. The degree of harm to the family unit is greater in criminal law. For the 
family in general and the victim in particular, the civil claim process for tortious 
actions of the parent against the child is preferable to turning to criminal courts, 
since imprisonment or other harsh sanction of the parent will almost certainly 
damage the family (including the victim himself) more than civil penalties 
would. 
6. Even though the criminal process is initiated by the state, and not a 
family member, criminal charges and civil claims are brought for the same 
wrongful actions, so it does not make sense to allow one but not the other. It is 
in the civil process alone that the child is a direct party to the dispute, a fact 
which in certain circumstances may deepen the conflict and harm the family 
unit as a whole, but in others may empower the child by giving him legal 
equality with his parents. 
B.  The Considerations Against Recognition of the Claim: 
1. Allowing a child to bring a civil suit against his parents might be contrary to 
the best interests of the child and the family. This is the central consideration 
opposing recognition of the claim. The best interests of the child are a core 
principle according to § 3 of United Nations Convention on the rights of the 
Child (UNCRC),27 the most comprehensive international document dealing with 
the rights of children. § 12 of UNCRC puts forth that children who are capable 
of forming their own views and expressing their own wishes and feelings must 
be allowed to participate in legal processes affecting them and weight must be 
accorded to their wishes; but there is no express provision which states that the 
court must make a decision in matters regarding children (like guardianship, 
visitation, etc.) in accordance with their wishes. It follows that § 12 does not vest 
the child with full autonomy similar to that of an adult, and it certainly does not 
per se vest the child with the right to sue his parents. In effect, § 12 contains two 
qualifications: ability and age. The right of the child to express a view and be 
heard only applies to a child who is capable of forming his own views, and the 
weight which will be accorded to his views will depend on his age and maturity. 
Clearly it is adults who determine the degree to which these parameters are 
satisfied, so that § 12 too is, in effect, paternalistic and does not establish rights 
for a child which are equivalent to those of an adult.28 In addition, § 12 must be 
read together with § 5 of UNCRC, which preserves the rights and duties of 
parents. Together, these sections insist that the desire of the child must be taken 
into account, but the child’s desire will not always be consistent with his actual 
best interests. Indeed, according to the family approach, which, acknowledges 
the unique nature of families and allows them to conduct themselves as self-
 
 27. UNCRC, supra note 15. 
 28. Cf. Michael Freeman, The Right to be Heard, 22 ADOPTION & FOSTERING 50-59 (1998-99). 
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contained units, without legal intervention into their affairs, autonomy, or 
privacy, a child’s claim against a parent may be contrary to that child’s best 
interests because it leads to a confrontation between the parent and child.29 
Such a confrontation may also arise in a criminal case brought for the same 
acts, but in the criminal process it is the state which brings the charges. Because in 
civil law it is the victim who decides whether to bring a suit against the tortfeasor, 
if a child were to choose to do so, it is easy to imagine a situation where he would 
be seen as the enemy of the parent.  The child might not understand that 
insistence upon giving effect to his right to bring a civil suit against his parents 
may be incompatible with his own interests. 
Moreover, the child’s claim may be contrary to the best interests of the 
entire family unit, as it may strain relations between the child and the rest of the 
family, who may not see him as a victim but as their enemy. If the parents have 
to pay him damages, it harms the rest of the family too. The resulting fissure in 
the family would likely be very difficult to heal, and the child may be the one 
who suffers most. For this reason, the Jewish law principle “ground of 
animosity” 30 only recognizes a child’s civil claim when he is not dependent on 
his father or he is otherwise detached from the family (e.g. because he has 
reached the age of majority or has been legally or actually separated). 
From a public and family perspective, one may argue that the public has an 
interest in preserving family tranquility and harmony that will be ignored if the 
civil claim of a child is permitted. This consideration holds that recognition of 
such a claim endangers the harmony of the family unit, which from society’s 
perspective is an important, if not the most important, unit of society. 
Accordingly, proponents of this view argue that in cases where there is a 
possibility of restoring family harmony, no recognition should be accorded to 
the child’s claim, since in addition to disrupting the harmony of the family, 
these kinds of claims also harm the privacy of the family.31 Another argument is 
that courts should not examine non-monetary parent-child issues from a legal 
viewpoint;32 if they did, they would be essentially trying to commercialize the 
love and affection of the parent toward the child.33 
Under this approach, priority is given to the well-being of the entire family 
over the well-being of just one of its members, even if the individual is weak and 
needs the protection of the law. However, this family approach does not apply 
in cases where it is clearly not possible to restore the family harmony, especially 
in cases where the child’s parent no longer has legal parental responsibility for 
the child, such as when the child is transferred to another guardian or reaches 
the age of majority. 
According to this consideration, the individualistic approach that advocates 
maximizing intervention in the name of equality and justice ignores the fact that 
intrafamilial relations cannot maintain full equality. The aspiration for equality 
between parents and their children is neither practical nor appropriate. Moreover, 
 
 29. Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595, 600 (Minn. 1980). 
 30. See an extended discussion in the text accompanying footnote 129. 
 31. See, e.g., Wagner v. Smith, 340 N.W.2d 255 (Iowa 1983). 
 32. See, e.g., Kane v. Quigley, 203 N.E.2d 338 (Ohio 1964). 
 33. Id. at 339. 
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it is problematic to look at parent-child relations through the prism of corrective 
justice, which is solely concerned with the two parties to the dispute and fails to 
take into account other members of the family who will be affected by the child’s 
claim. Though the family is technically a collection of individuals, these 
individuals create a unit—located between the public and private domains—
which is so important to society that its sanctity must be protected. Therefore, 
while in most civil cases damage that may be done to third parties is disregarded, 
such damage cannot be disregarded when the third parties are external to the 
claim, but not external to the family. The ramifications of the claim on the family 
as a whole may be economic (the damages awarded to the child may come at the 
expense of the welfare of other members of the family) or emotional (perception of 
the plaintiff as the enemy of the family and responsible for its collapse). 
Nonetheless, this argument per se prevents recognition of any suit from one 
member of a family against another, and could even be construed to argue 
against laying criminal charges against parents for crimes against their children. 
However, if a child wants to bring a civil claim against his parents it seems 
likely that there is already an absence of harmony in the family. In such cases, in 
order for the family to try to recover from its existing problems, it may be 
necessary for the tortfeasor to take responsibility for and cease to commit his 
tortious actions and occasionally by bringing a civil claim the child can thus 
restore, rather than disrupt, the harmony of the family.34 
2. Recognition of the claim undermines the parent’s authority to discipline 
the child, leads to disobedience towards the parent, and thereby impairs an 
important tool in the “game of roles” in the family dynamics.35 However, it can 
be asserted that parental authority is constrained by certain rules and the parent 
cannot be allowed to do as he pleases. In addition, this argument is irrelevant 
when the child no longer lives with his parents. 
3. The claim might be used as a weapon in a dispute between the parents. One of 
the parents might influence the child to sue the other parent for wrongs 
committed against the child, or might join the child as an additional plaintiff in a 
claim which the parent files against his spouse in order to hurt him.36 In such a 
situation the loss is twofold: the child is used as a tool in the dispute and the 
family itself is damaged, allegedly in order to give effect to the rights of the 
child. 
4. There are alternative courses of action, both legal and extra-judicial, 
such as criminal charges or approaching Social Services for assistance. However, 
 
 34. Cf. Rhona Schuz, Child Protection in the Israeli Supreme Court: Tortious Parenting, Physical 
Punishment and Criminal Child Abuse, in THE INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY LAW 2001 EDITION 
165, 176 (Andrew Bainham ed., 2001) (noting that civil claims do not harm the family to the same 
extent as criminal proceedings). 
 35. Rambo v. Rambo, 114 S.W.2d 468, 469 (Ark. 1938); Felderhoff v. Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d 928, 
933 (Tex. 1971). 
 36. Many claims are submitted in such cases. See, e.g., Kane, 203 N.E.2d 338; Daily v. Parker, 152 
F. 2d 174 (7th Cir. 1945); Trevarton v. Trevarton, 378 P. 2d 640 (7th Cir. 1963); Courtney v. Courtney, 
413 S.E. 2d 418 (W. Va. 1991). 
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in many cases the child is too afraid of repercussions to seek help from the 
authorities, and it is not the child’s decision whether to bring criminal charges. 
In addition, neither of these courses of action seek to compensate the child, and 
they are not always suitable in situations where the parental conduct has 
already terminated and the child is now interested in compensation for past 
suffering for the purpose of self-rehabilitation. 
5. The floodgates argument.37 It is possible that as soon as courts agree to 
recognize the civil suits of children against their parents, the courts will be 
flooded with such suits.38 
6. The slippery slope problem. Even if the case law states that these claims 
should only be recognized in rare cases, once the first judgment has been 
delivered recognizing such a claim, it is subject to interpretation and the dam 
which the judge intended to construct may be swiftly breached as people seek to 
circumvent the restrictions.39 In order to block the slide down the slippery slope, 
either case law or legislation needs to establish clear criteria to determine when 
to recognize such claims. 
7. Fear of conspiracy, deceit, and insurance fraud. Allowing a child to bring a 
civil claim against his parent opens the door for possible conspiracies in the 
form of fictitious claims against insured parents aimed at enriching the family 
coffers by defrauding or otherwise exploiting insurance companies.40 The 
potential for such conspiracies exists in other types of law as well, however,41 
and the legal system has developed the means to find out whether a fraud has 
occurred.42 In addition, accepting such an argument would deny any intrafamilial 
claim and prevent the implementation of a statutory right.43 Anyway, it may be 
assumed that emotional neglect will fall outside the coverage of the insurance 
policy. If the tortious behavior is covered by the insurance, it will generally entail an 
accident caused by a family member or some other unintentional tort. 
8. Recognition of the claim undermines the respect due to the mother and father 
and shows contempt for the defendant parent. Respecting one’s parents is a religious 
 
 37. See McLoughlin v. O’Brian (1982) 2 All Eng. Rep. 298 (H. L.) (opinion of Lord Wilberforce). 
 38. Morrow v. Yannantuono, N.Y.S. 912 (N.Y. 1934); Johnson v. Luhmen, 71 N.E. 2d 810 (Ill. 
1947). 
 39. See, e.g., Levesque v. Levesque, 106 A. 2d 563 (N.H. 1954) (in cases of road accidents); Daily, 
152 F. 2d 174 (in cases of alienation of affection); but see Miller v. Monsen, 37 N.W. 2d 543 (Minn. 
1949) (arguing that reality shows that the fear of slippery slope has no basis, and in any case that fear 
should not block the realization of rights). 
 40. Gibson v. Gibson, 479 P. 2d 648 (Cal. 1971); Haley, supra note 6, at 579, 600; GEORGE C. CHRISTIE 
ET. AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF TORTS 544-45 (4th ed., 2004); Ira Mark Ellman & Stephen 
D. Sugarman, Spousal Emotional Abuse as a Tort?, 55 MD. L. REV. 1268, 1286 (1996). 
 41. Holodook v. Spencer, 324 N.E.2d 338 (N.Y. 1974). 
 42. Foldi v. Jeffries, 461 A. 2d 1145 (N.J. 1983). 
 43. CHRISTIE, supra note 40, at 548; Goller v. White, 122 N.W.2d 193 (Wis. 1963). 
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commandment which also has a certain place in secular legal systems.44 If a 
child commences legal proceedings against his parents, he may be violating that 
commandment. Despite this argument, a child’s claim against his parents has 
been recognized in certain circumstances by certain legal systems (as this paper 
will show below), and one cannot see the child’s respect for his parents as a 
parameter that is taken into account in the judgments. 
9. Problems which originate in the laws of succession and the fear that a 
wrongdoer will profit. On the death of the child it is the parent who inherits the 
child’s estate.45 Thus, it is possible to conceive of the undesirable legal outcome 
in which a person can inherit the monies which he himself paid to the person 
who sued him.46 Nonetheless, this problem can be circumvented by suitable 
legislation (most children do not write wills), and such cases will be rare. 
This paper will now examine how different legal systems have weighed 
these considerations when faced with cases of emotional neglect, which are 
especially problematic, because in such cases, not only is the child suing his 
parents, but the subject matter of the case is rooted in love and emotions. Thus, we 
are faced with the question, ought such cases to be above the reach and handling 
of the law and therefore not justiciable? In many cases, emotional neglect is 
accompanied by other forms of damaging parental conduct, such as material 
neglect or abuse, and it is this misconduct on which the law should focus. In 
addition, emotional neglect can be difficult to identify because it does not leave 
external, physical scars.47 
Those who give greater weight to the considerations favoring recognition of 
the claim favor sweeping legal intervention, treating a claim by one member of the 
family against another in the same way as claims between individuals, with 
emphasis on the rights of the child. In contrast, those who give greater weight to the 
considerations against recognition of the claim tend toward minimal legal 
intervention, protecting the sanctity of the family as an autonomous legal unit, at 
least for as long as no red lines are crossed. However, the law has developed two 
additional models which lie somewhere between these two extreme viewpoints. 
Parts III through VI will describe the four prevailing models. Part VII will 
demonstrate how it is possible to bridge the gap between competing approaches by 
creating a desirable model that relies on both secular and religious legal systems. 
 
 44. See, e.g., § 16 Capacity and Guardianship Law, 5722-1962, 16 LSI 106 (1962) (Isr.) [hereinafter 
LCGL] (compelling a child to obey his parents in each matter that falls within their guardianship of 
him and to respect them). 
 45. See, e.g., Trevarton v. Trevarton, 378 P. 2d 640 (7th Cir. 1963); Roter v. Roter, 866 P. 2d 929 
(Colo. 1994). 
 46. Roller v. Roller, 79 P. 788, 789 (Wash. 1905); Thomas J. Herthel, Parental Immunity in 
Alabama: Let's Not Let Parents Get Away With Murder-An Argument to Reexamine the Issue, 25 CUMB. L. 
REV. 409, 431 (1994-95). 
 47. Neeley, supra note 1, at 689-720; Marcia A. Kincanon, The Child Abuse that Doesn't Count: 
General and Emotional Neglect, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1039, 1043 (1989). 
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III.  THE MINIMAL LEGAL INTERVENTION MODEL: POSITIVE REGULATION OF PARENT 
IMMUNITY 
A. Roman Law: The Rule of the Father – Patria Potestas 
The Roman minimal legal intervention model creates a unique arrangement 
for the family which operates on the premise that a parent (in particular the father) 
must enjoy almost complete immunity from legal intervention in his dealings with 
his child. It is important to consider this issue in the context of Roman law in order 
to understand the origins of current legal models surrounding father-child relations. 
Roman law practiced patriarchal internal family control, under which the 
father was the head of the family and controlled its affairs on all levels, so that 
the family was almost independently governed. This supremacy was called “the 
rule of the father” or patria potestas.48 The father’s almost complete control over 
his children continued even after they reached the age of majority or married.49 
The state only intervened in intrafamilial relations in very rare cases. It certainly 
did not award compensation to children who suffered neglect or violence from 
their parents.50 
Moreover, the “rule of the father” granted the father the power of 
adjudication over members of the family who were subject to his authority, to 
the extent that he was described as having the power to “rule over life and 
death” (just vitae necisque potestas).51 Indeed, in certain cases Roman law 
permitted the father to punish the child even to the extent of killing him. On rare 
occasions the government would intervene, but only as the exception.52 
Underlying the “rule of the father” is the concept that the family is a small and 
basic governmental unit within society, one which must be given almost 
complete autonomy to conduct its affairs so that the government could 
concentrate on other matters; therefore, the father acted as a quasi execution 
officer on behalf of the government. Under the “rule of the father,” the child’s 
rights were seriously impaired, and sometimes even completely abrogated, all 
with the acquiescence of government.53 
From a modern perspective, the “rule of the father” seems to be a distant 
concept that has passed from the world. However, the basis for the creation of a 
separate law for the family unit has survived, albeit in a less acute way, in 
modern law, as the next section will explore. 
 
 48. See generally JANE F. GARDNER, WOMEN IN ROMAN LAW AND SOCIETY 5-29, 67-68, 137-54 
(Indiana University Press 1991); BARRY NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 80-82 (1962); 
Mason P. Thomas Jr., Child Abuse and Neglect Part I: Historical Overview, Legal Matrix, and Social 
Perspectives, 50 N.C. L. REV. 293, 295 (1971-72); Lanham, supra note 14; R. Howe Brian, Do Parents have 
Fundamental Rights?, 36 J. OF CANADIAN STUD. 61, 66 (2001). The impact of Roman law on the law of 
European countries is discernible from the year 1100 onwards and particularly in the years 1495-
1900. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 US 390 (1923). 
 52. Thomas, supra note 48; TONI VAUGHN HEINEMAN, THE ABUSED CHILD: PSYCHODYNAMIC 
UNDERSTANDING & TREATMENT 15 (Guilford Press, 1998); Neeley, supra note 1, at 697. 
 53. Id. 
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B. Old American Law: The Doctrine of Parent-Child Immunity 
The end of the 19th century saw the development in American law of the 
principle of non-intervention in the family—the “doctrine of parent-child 
immunity” or the “doctrine of parental tort immunity.”54 This doctrine was 
created by American case law, which set substantive and formal obstacles in the 
path of recognition of children’s civil claims against parents who had harmed 
them.55 The case law explained that the purpose of the doctrine was “to protect 
parental discipline, domestic felicity and family tranquility.”56 The doctrine was 
formulated in three cases heard in three different states at the end of the 19th 
century and beginning of the 20th century, and accordingly these cases were 
known by their critics as “The Great Trilogy.”57 
In the beginning, there was broad acknowledgement of the doctrine and it 
spread rapidly to many states.58 The courts of the various states did not 
distinguish between negligent or reckless or deliberate parental action, and 
exempted parents from liability even in serious cases such as rape or abuse.59 
 
 54.  See generally Gail D. Hollister, Parent-Child Immunity: A Doctrine in Search of Justification, 50 
FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 495-96 (1982); Sean S. Modjarrad, Hartman v. Hartman: Is ‘Parental Immunity’ 
Recognized?, 22 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 463, 465-67 (1998); Haley, supra note 6, at 575-604; Neeley, supra 
note 1, at 700; Lanham, supra note 14, at 106; Joseph J. Basgier, Children’s Right: A Renewed Call for the 
End of Parental Immunity in Alabama and Arguments for the Further Expansion of a Child’s Right to Sue, 26 
LAW AND PSYCHOL. REV. 123, 123-39 (2000). 
 55.  FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS 573-74 (2d ed. 1986); Brenda K. Harmon, 
Parent-Child Tort Immunity: The Supreme Court of Illinois Finally Gives this Doctrine the Attention it's 
Been Demanding, 19 S. ILL. U. L.J. 633, 658 (1995). In common law countries there was no explicit 
doctrine of parental immunity. See, e.g., Ash v. Lady Ash, (1696) 90 Eng. Rep. 526 (hearing a girl’s 
claim of assault and false imprisonment against her mother); Young v. Rankin, (1934) S. C. 499 
(awarding damages to a child for his father’s negligent driving); McCallion v. Dodd [1966] N.Z.L.R. 
710 (S.C.) (awarding damages to a child for his father’s negligent driving); and see JOHN G. FLEMING, 
THE LAW OF TORTS 669 (Sydney, 5th ed., 1977) (arguing that the parent-child tort immunity doctrine 
has not spread in common law countries). 
 56. Wright v. Wright, 191 S.E.2d 223, 224 (Va. 1972). 
 57. Hewlett v. George, 9 So. 885 (Miss. 1891) (holding that recognition of a daughter’s tort claim 
against her mother might impair the harmony of the family unit and be contrary to the best interest 
and safety of society. Court dismissed daughter’s claim that she had been falsely imprisoned after 
the mother hospitalized her in a mental asylum with the aim of taking over her assets.); Mckelvey v. 
Mckelvey, 77 S.W 664 (Tenn. 1903) (dismissing a tort claim of a daughter against her stepmother and 
father for cruel punishment imposed on her by the mother which the father knew of but did not 
stop. The claim was dismissed on the grounds of preserving family harmony and the parent’s 
authority over the children, and court emphasized that it would not accept state interference by 
allowing it to replace the parent and impose discipline. The court pointed out that American 
common law did not offer relief for this type of damage); Roller v. Roller, 79 P. 788, 789 (Wash. 1905) 
(dismissing a daughter’s tort claim against her father for injury he caused by raping her. The court 
dismissed due to fear that the child would predecease the parent and then the parent would inherit 
the compensation award paid to the child. The court also noted that the compensation payment 
might leave the parent without resources and harm all the family members including the child 
herself). 
 58. Small v. Morrison, 118 S.E. 12 (N.C. 1923); ROBERT H. MNOOKIN & D. KELLY WEISBERG, 
CHILD, FAMILY AND STATE: PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW 347 (3rd ed. 1995). 
 59. Haley, supra note 6, at 578-79. 
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Most states recognized the doctrine until the 1950’s.60 Some states codified the 
immunity in one form or another in legislation.61 Over the years the states 
developed different rationales in support of the doctrine, and often it is difficult 
to identify a common thread between the judgments in various states. 
Since then, the doctrine of parental immunity has been subject to change and 
alternatives have been found in some states, but it has remained the lodestar that 
has guided state courts in actions brought by children against their parents. There 
are a few states which still continue to follow the original doctrine and thereby 
effectively adhere to the model of minimal intervention.62 Some states, however, 
have repudiated the model of minimal intervention and replaced it with a 
different standard, one which will be considered in section IV. 
C. Critique 
The consequence of immunity in Roman law and in old American law was 
similar—a child could not bring an action against his parent—but the rationale 
for each was different. In Roman law, the government was not interested in 
interfering with the family and it was convenient that the father would fulfill 
both the judicial and executive function of the government within the family. 
Despite its current problematic outcomes, the American doctrine of parental 
immunity was intended to preserve the harmony and integrity of the family 
unit. This rationale was based on the assumption that although a parent 
engaging in harsh behavior towards his children could be punished in a 
criminal setting, where the state was the accuser, recognizing a civil claim 
submitted against him by his children would harm the family unit. 
This model is gradually, and rightfully, disappearing globally. Granting 
immunity to parents for their actions against their children is not appropriate in 
contemporary times. In cases that are completely unconnected to parental 
authority (e.g., damage caused to the child by a parent in his capacity as a driver 
or employer) or in serious situations such as abuse and even rape, parental 
immunity cannot be accepted under modern law. Nonetheless, the best interest 
of the family and preservation of family harmony, albeit not at any price, can 
help in creating a model for solving the fundamental dilemma. 
 
 60. Modjarrad, supra note 54, at 467-68; Herthel, supra note 46, at 412-14; Martin J. Rooney & 
Colleen M. Rooney, Parental Tort Immunity: Spare the Liability, Spoil the Parent, 25 NEW ENG. L. REV. 
1161, 1164 (1991); Basgier, supra note 54, at 126. 
 61. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:571 (1960). 
 62. Edwin D. Akers & William H. Drummond, Tort Actions Between Members of the Family  
Husband & Wife - Parent & Child, 26 MO. L. REV. 152, 194 (1961); Lanham, supra note 14; Neeley, supra 
note 1, at 700. 
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IV. THE MODERATE LEGAL INTERVENTION MODEL: SPECIFIC AND RELATIVE 
DEFENSES OF A PARENT IN PREVAILING LAW 
A. The Prevailing American Law 
1. Overview 
The present model in a majority of the U.S. jurisdictions is a qualified 
doctrine of parental immunity, or reliance on a standard similar to that found in 
the Restatement of Torts.63 
In the years following the initial recognition of the parental immunity 
doctrine, a similar spousal immunity was gradually abrogated.64 Emotional 
harm caused by a tort committed by one spouse against another attained legal 
recognition and also found general expression in the provisions of the 
Restatement dealing with the intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED),65 
which has become increasingly accepted throughout the United States.66 In some 
states, though, IIED is recognized only in cases of severe emotional distress,67 or 
as an outcome of physical abuse or corporal punishment.68 Both spousal and 
parental immunities stem from the same family domain, so it is likely that the 
repeal of inter-spousal immunity spurred the changes which followed in the 
arena of parental immunity. 
The doctrine of parental immunity has not been repealed in most of the 
United States.69 However, a large number of states have qualified it in many 
respects.70 Some of the qualifications stem from the understanding that when 
damage occurs outside of the parent’s role as a parent (for example in the 
 
 63. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965) [hereinafter the Restatement]. 
 64. The immunity against mutual claims by spouses was repealed in most modern systems of 
law. In English law this immunity was repealed in 1962, and it was provided that in civil claims 
spouses would be treated in the same way as single persons; in American law the immunity was 
based on the ground that the spouses in effect comprised a single entity (“unity of person”) and 
accordingly one spouse could not sue the other. This immunity was gradually abrogated in the 
various American states, particularly in the second third of the 20th century. See Haley, supra note 6, 
at 598-602. 
 65. Ellman & Sugarman, supra note 40, at 1269. The Restatement deals with that through §46.1, 
in general, not especially in terms of familial relations: “One who by extreme and outrageous 
conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability 
for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.” 
 66.  LEONARD KARP, DOMESTIC TORTS: FAMILY VIOLENCE, CONFLICT, AND SEXUAL ABUSE 116 
(Rev. ed. 2005). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Deana Pollard, Banning Child Corporal Punishment, 77 TUL. L. REV. 575, 647-57 (2002-2003) 
(expanding on the American case law and studies on emotional neglect and emotional harm arising 
from child abuse and corporal punishment). 
 69. See generally, DAN B. DOBBS & PAUL T. HAYDEN, TORTS AND COMPENSATION 388-89 (4th ed. 
2001). In some states the parent-tort immunity doctrine was retained. See, e.g., Commerce Bank v. 
Augsburger, 680 N.E.2d 822, 827 (Ill. 1997) (dismissing a suit against parents who had locked a girl 
in a bedroom closet and failed to monitor her. The girl died from asphyxia, but the court held that 
the immunity applied to “parental discretion in the provision of care including maintenance of the 
family home, medical treatment, and supervision of the child.”). 
 70. Id. 
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context of a work relationship)71 parental immunity cannot be justified. In most 
of the United States, immunity does not apply when the defendant is actually a 
third party, such as the employer of the parent or his insurer, even though the 
basis for the claim is the parent’s behavior.72 It also does not apply to contractual 
and property claims,73 to property damage (as opposed to personal injuries), or 
to claims of wrongful life.74 In some states it has even been held in the case law 
that the doctrine will protect a natural parent only, and not one who comes in 
loco parentis, even an adoptive parent.75 
In cases where the legal ties between the child and the defendant biological 
parent have been severed, either because the child has reached the age of 
majority or because he has been transferred to the custody of a different 
guardian, immunity has not been recognized, because the primary rationale of 
protecting the sanctity of the family unit is no longer relevant. Clearly, this is 
also the reasoning behind the refusal to recognize immunity in cases where one 
of the parties (the child or parent) is no longer alive, and the claim is brought by 
or against the estate.76 
Since the 1960’s, the doctrine of parental immunity has been significantly 
qualified, beginning with a landmark case which started a wave which 
ultimately led to the overwhelming repudiation of the doctrine as presented in 
its original form. 
2. Parental Authority – “The Wisconsin Approach” 
In Goller v. White, a 1963 Wisconsin court dealt with the negligence of a 
father who sat his step-son on a farm tractor and the child was injured.77 The 
court found that the parental immunity rule in negligence cases was to be 
abrogated except where the alleged negligent act involved an exercise of 
parental authority over the child or where it involved an exercise of ordinary 
parental discretion with respect to the provision of food, clothing, housing, 
medical and dental services, and other care. The court ruled that in every other 
case the immunity had no application, even if the parent’s actions were 
 
 71. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 150 A. 905 (N.H. 1930). 
 72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895 cmt. d (1977); Schlessinger v. Schlessinger, 796 P.2d 
1385 (1990); Allstate Insurance Company v. Kyong Hu Kim, 829 A.2d 611 (2003); William E. 
McCurdy, Torts between Parents and Children, 5 VILL. L. REV. 521, 540 (1960). But see Henderson v. 
Woolley, 644 A.2d 1303, 1305 (Conn. 1994); Rousey v. Rousey, 528 A.2d 416 (D.C. 1987); Wagner v. 
Smith, 340 N.W.2d 255 (Iowa 1983); Levesque v. Levesque, 106 A.2d 563 (N.H. 1954). 
 73. Rousey, 528 A.2d at 528; Signs v. Signs, 103 N.E.2d 743, 748 (Ohio 1952). 
 74. Haley, supra note 6, at 587-89. 
 75. A. John Hoomani & Kimberly Sieredzki Woodell, Liner v. Brown: Where Should We Go From 
Here - Two Different Approaches for North Carolina, 19 CAMPBELL L. REV. 447 (1996-97). 
 76. Stacey L. Ross, The Parental Tort Immunity Doctrine Applied to Wrongful Death Actions: A Rule 
without Reason, 13 S. ILL. U. L.J. 175 (1988-89). 
 77. Goller v. White, 122 N.W.2d 193 (Wis. 1963); cf. Barrett v. London Borough of Enfield (1999) 
2 F.L.R. 426 (H.L.) (Lord Slynn of Hadley in obiter dictum) (“[A] parent does not have a blanket 
immunity for whatever he does to his child; negligence in driving a car by a parent would still be 
actionable if the child was caused injury ... in respect of some matters, parents do have an actionable 
duty of care. [But] ... the court should be slow to hold that a child can sue its parents for negligent 
decisions in its upbringing”). 
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negligent rather than deliberate and intentional.78 Following this judgment, the 
resulting qualified immunity doctrine was known as “The Wisconsin rule.”79 
The Wisconsin approach opened the door for a considerable constriction of 
the doctrine of parental immunity in many states. Some courts explained their 
qualification of “parental authority” on the grounds that because society 
requires the parent to maintain order in the family, it is society which must 
protect the other members of the family should the parent overstep his bounds 
in the exercise of his society-given authority.80 
In 1972 in Wisconsin v. Yoder,81 the United States Supreme Court ruled that 
a parent could not exercise unfettered control over his child, and that if he 
exceeded the boundaries of acceptable behavior, he could be exposed to a civil 
claim. This further qualification of parental immunity became known as the 
“parental authority” qualification.82 
Over time, particularly in the 1970’s and the beginning of the 1980’s, the 
“parental authority” qualification developed further, to the point that most 
states denied parental immunity in cases of negligence by a parent leading to the 
child’s injury.83 These cases included both domestic accidents, such as damage 
caused by electrical appliances, and accidents and injuries caused outside the 
home, such as failure to care for a child crossing the road.84 This qualification, in 
effect, removed cases of negligent lack of care from the scope of the immunity.85 
Taking this qualification a step further, it makes sense to argue that cases of 
deliberate and persistent emotional neglect, which also do not ensue from the 
exercise of the parent’s authority regarding the needs of the child, should a 
fortiori be excluded from the scope of parental immunity. 
These qualifications to the doctrine of parental immunity gradually began 
to breach the walls of the dam, and the courts in various states began re-
examining the broad scope of the doctrine and limiting it to cases of negligence 
ensuing from the exercise of parental authority.86 In most states the doctrine was 
not entirely abrogated, and it continues to apply in one form or another to this 
day.87 Even in those states which have chosen to retain the doctrine rather than 
turned to one of the alternative models, it has been restricted by means of 
exceptions, particularly in accordance with the Wisconsin approach, and has 
been rejected, for example, in cases of sexual offenses, road accidents, and the 
performance of deliberate and outrageous acts by the parent.88 
As a result of the restrictions on the application of the doctrine of parental 
immunity, increased numbers of civil suits were filed throughout the United 
States since the 1960’s and 1970’s by children alleging various types of abuse by 
 
 78. Goller v. White, 122 N.W.2d 193, 197-99 (Wis. 1963). 
 79. Haley, supra note 6, at 596. 
 80. Neeley, supra note 1, at 703. 
 81. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 82. See also Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
 83. Haley, supra note 6, at 590, 595-96. 
 84. See, e.g., Thoreson v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transport Co., 201 N.W.2d 745 (Wis. 1972). 
 85. Haley, supra note 6, at 589-90, 595. 
 86. Id. at 593-94. 
 87. Id. at 593-94. See also note 94 at 593. 
 88. Id. at 581, 585; Neeley, supra note 1, at 700. 
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their parents.89 At the same time there were those who criticized the doctrine 
even in its new circumscribed state. They asserted that it was no longer 
appropriate, and that courts should rely on the common law, which has ways of 
drawing a proper balance in the circumstances of each case without the aid of 
the doctrine.90 
3. Emotional Damage – Burnette v. Wahl 
One interesting test case for the use of the parental immunity doctrine and 
the different qualifications for it was Burnette v. Wahl.91 In this 1978 case, the 
Supreme Court of Oregon considered whether to recognize tort claims brought 
by three minor children who were in the custody of social services, acting 
through their guardians, for damages due to emotional neglect. The claims were 
against their mothers for emotional neglect.92 In Burnette, the plaintiffs argued 
that the parents’ behavior amounted to breaches of criminal and civil statutes in 
the state of Oregon, which imposed various duties on the parent,93 including the 
duty to support their children (particularly indigent children) and a prohibition 
on neglecting and abandoning them.94 The plaintiffs, all of whom were indigent, 
argued that the mothers had failed to provide them with care, custody, parental 
nurturance, affection, comfort, companionship, and support.95 They alleged that 
the mothers did not take part in raising the children, and did not maintain 
regular contact or visitation.96 The children also alleged that through their 
behavior the mothers neglected and in effect abandoned their children and 
deprived them of the love, care, affection, and comfort to which they were 
entitled, thereby endangering their health and welfare.97 Finally, it was alleged 
that they neglected their children maliciously, intentionally, and with cruel 
disregard for the consequential emotional and psychological injuries to the 
children.98 
Under the qualified doctrine that prevailed in Oregon at the time, the court 
could have allowed the claim and not applied the doctrine of immunity. Instead, 
the court dismissed the claim by a majority decision. Even within the majority 
judgment there were several disparate perspectives on and approaches to 
dealing with the considerations for and against recognition of civil suits by 
children against their parents, specifically in cases of emotional neglect. 
Judge Holman, who wrote the majority opinion, identified a problem in 
recognizing emotional neglect, in contrast to recognizing physical damage or 
even emotional damage caused by a physical act, such as a beating, rape, or 
 
 89. Akers & Drummond, supra note 62 ; Lanham, supra note 14; Neeley, supra note 1, at 700. 
 90. See, e.g., Basgier, supra note 54, at 123 ;Buchler v. State, 853 P.2d 798, 808-09 (Or. 1993). 
 91. Burnette v. Wahl, 588 P.2d 1105 (Or. 1978). 
 92. Id. at 1107. 
 93. Id. 
 94. OR. REV. STAT. § 109.010 (2007); OR. REV. STAT.§ 163.535 (2007); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.545 
(2007); OR. REV. STAT. §163.555 (2007). 
 95. Burnette v. Wahl, 588 P.2d 1105, 1107 (Or. 1978). 
 96. Id. at 1108-09. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
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injury in an automobile accident.99 In his opinion, the court had to recognize the 
limits of its power and refrain from intruding excessively in internal family 
relations in a manner which might undermine the fundamental elements of the 
legal system, interfere with the objectives of the original Oregon legislation, and 
consequently cause tension between courts and the legislature.100 The judge also 
took a principled stand against the possibility of recognizing such claims, citing 
the same grounds that underpinned the original doctrine. In his view, 
recognition of the claim would lead to additional rifts within the family and 
prevent any possibility of healing it, contrary to the “therapeutic” objectives of 
the Oregon legislation.101 The core of the judgment therefore relied upon the 
traditional primary consideration against recognition of these claims: the best 
interests of the family as a whole taking precedence over the interests of an 
individual member of the family. Judge Holman also raises an interesting point: 
In addition to the contention that defendants should be liable for civil damages 
because of their violation of criminal and regulatory statutes, plaintiffs also 
contend that defendants are responsible because of the infliction of severe 
emotional distress by intentional acts. Plaintiffs allege that defendants 
intentionally deserted and abandoned them; however, they do not contend that 
defendants deserted them for the purpose of inflicting emotional harm upon 
them. We recognize that this tort usually also encompasses the infliction of 
emotional harm under circumstances from which a reasonable person would 
conclude that harm was almost certain to result. We believe this latter rationale 
is inapplicable as between parents and children. If it were otherwise, the 
children of divorced parents would almost always have an action for emotional 
damage against their parents. Divorce has become a way of life with almost 
certain emotional trauma of a greater or lesser degree to the children from the 
legal dissolution of the family and the resultant absence of at least one of the 
parents and sometimes of both.102 
Judge Tongue concurred with this outcome, but not with the underlying 
rationale.103 He pointed out that the Oregon Supreme Court had previously 
abandoned the doctrine of intrafamilial tort immunity at least in its original 
form, and had recognized the need to award damages to a child for intentional 
torts that resulted in physical injuries. In his opinion, it did not follow that the 
doctrine should also be abandoned for torts resulting only in “mental and 
emotional injuries.”104 
Judge Lent emphasized the seriousness of mental and emotional injury, but 
concurred with the majority opinion because the plaintiffs had not succeeded in 
proving that the mother’s behavior amounted to “outrageous conduct.”105 
 
 99. Id. at 1108. 
 100. Id. at 1108-10. 
 101. Id. at 1110-11. 
 102. Id. at 1112. Cf, as to English law, Barrett v. London Borough of Enfield (1999) 2 F.L.R. 426 
(H.L.). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 1112-15. See Courtney v. Courtney, 413 S.E. 2d 418 (W. Va. 1991), for a discussion of 
this principle after Burnette. 
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The dissenting opinion was written by Judge Linde.106 According to the 
judge, the claim had to be recognized, particularly because the Oregon statute 
did not expressly reject such a claim.107 The judge referred to the primary 
consideration raised in the majority opinion and argued that it would be 
difficult to award compensation for neglect with disregard for the malicious, 
intentional consequences as causing harm to the family, since mothers who 
acted in such a way had already destroyed the family by their conduct and 
violated their duties towards their children.108 In any other type of relationship, 
the claim would have been recognized. The majority opinion had dismissed the 
claim, inter alia, because the injury was emotional and psychological rather than 
physical. According to Judge Linde, if one were to accept the premise of the 
majority opinion, and the law always had to take into account the need to re-
establish harmony within the family unit, then civil claims would also have to 
be dismissed where the damage to the child was physical. However, U.S. courts 
in general, and Oregon courts in particular, did recognize such claims.109 The 
judge also argued that it is incongruous to hold that the legislature provided for 
felony prosecution of parents who violated these duties, and at the same time 
meant to exclude tort claims for fear of impairing the family unit.110 
Burnette neatly illustrates the varying and conflicting approaches that may 
be taken toward the doctrine of parental immunity. Despite the logic of Judge 
Linde’s dissent, it appears that no United States court has recognized the tort 
claim of a child against his parent for emotional neglect. 
In the literature there are those who support the majority opinion and 
assert that the appropriate way to solve such disputes does not involve 
recognition of civil suits against parents.111 However, scholars have voiced 
considerable criticism of the majority opinion, placing emphasis on the fact that 
one cannot ignore the fact that two of the dissenting judges had advocated the 
abrogation of parental immunity and raised good reasons for that opinion.112 
Some argue that there is no reason not to recognize tort claims against parents in 
cases of emotional neglect,113 since similar claims based on physical or sexual 
cruelty have been recognized, some of which included emotional injury (albeit 
not as the sole injury). In addition, courts eventually recognized an independent 
cause of action for emotional injury in suits between spouses, and as that 
doctrine evolved it would have been appropriate for the doctrine of parental 
immunity to evolve simultaneously.114 
 
 106. Id. at 1115-19. 
 107. Id. at 1116-19. 
 108. Id. at 1118-19. 
 109. Id. at 1119. 
 110. Id. at 1118-19. 
 111. Lanham, supra note 14, at 116-18; Mary Kate Kearney, Breaking the Silence: Tort Liability for 
Failing to Protect Children from Abuse, 42 BUFF. L. REV. 405, 406-08, 434-36 (1994). 
 112. Guynn, supra note 4, at 508. 
 113. Neeley, supra note 1, at 701, 705. 
 114. See Benjamin Shmueli, Tort Litigation between Spouses: Let's Meet Somewhere in the Middle, 15 
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010). 
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4. The Reasonable and Prudent Parent Standard – “The California 
Approach” 
It is likely that some of this criticism, together with other criticisms voiced 
against the doctrine over the years, contributed to the fact that about one fifth of 
U.S. states repealed or abandoned parental immunity in the latter half of the 20th 
century, and were also unwilling to accept the qualified doctrine, which they 
saw as anachronistic.115 Some of these states instead adopted a standard 
originating from the tort of negligence, the “reasonable and prudent parent 
standard.” This standard, which was first adopted in California at the beginning 
of the 1970’s, and therefore earned the label “the California approach,” tested 
whether the parent had acted the way an “ordinary and careful” parent would 
reasonably have acted towards his children in similar circumstances.116 
According to some views, this test was sufficiently flexible and drew an 
adequate balance between the need to preserve the authority of the parent and 
the need to impose legal liability upon him in the appropriate cases.117 
A number of states did not adopt any special standard for the family 
framework, and used standards which were similar, in effect, to the model 
described next, the stringent-sweeping legal intervention model. Such states 
contemplate the use of the ordinary tools of civil torts in these types of cases, 
while expressly opposing the California approach.118 
5. The Restatement Standard 
Other states adopted yet another standard, similar yet different to the 
qualified doctrine. This standard draws its principles from the Restatement, § 
895G (2): 
(1) A parent or child is not immune from tort liability to the other solely by 
reason of that relationship. 
(2) Repudiation of general tort immunity does not establish liability for an 
act or omission that, because of the parent-child relationship, is otherwise 
privileged or is not tortious.119 
The provision recognizes the possibility of imposing liability upon a 
parent. However, the argument that parents should be able to use their 
discretion when exercising their authority over their child may be sufficient 
 
 115. Haley, supra note 6, at 603-04. 
 116. Herthel, supra note 46, at 414-15; Basgier, supra note 54, at 128-29. 
 117. Broadbent v. Broadbent, 907 P.2d 43, 49-50 (Ariz. 1995); Gibson v. Gibson, 479 P.2d 648, 653 
(Cal. 1971); Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595, 596, 601 (Minn. 1980); Hartman v. Hartman, 821 
S.W.2d 852, 857 (Mo. 1991); Kendall v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 634 S.W.2d 176, 180 (Mo. 1982). 
 118. This settlement took place in the state of New York a few years after the California standard 
was announced. See Holodook v. Spencer, 324 N.E.2d 338, 346 (N.Y. 1974). For discussion and 
comparison between the two standards, see Haley, supra note 6, at 596-97. In my opinion, the roots of 
this approach can be found a few years earlier, before the California Approach. See Gelbman v. 
Gelbman, 245 N.E.2d 192 (N.Y. 1969). Nonetheless, it should be noted that even in the state of New 
York itself one cannot find a single clear common thread in the case law. Compare id., and Holodook, 324 
N.E.2d at 346, with Hairston v. Broadwater, 342 N.Y.S.2d 787 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973). 
 119. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 895G(2) (1977). According to Comment K, when the tort 
has no direct connection to familial relations, there would be no special defense at all. 
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grounds for not imposing liability.120 Thus, in 1984, the Supreme Court of 
Oregon abrogated the parental immunity doctrine and replaced it with the 
Restatement standard, holding that this standard was clearer than its 
alternatives and allowed the creation of a separate duty of care for a parent, one 
which was distinct from the ordinary duty of care in negligence cases.121 
Nonetheless, in a later case, the Oregon Court of Appeals found it difficult to 
interpret and implement the new standard and criticized its vagueness.122 
Finally, in order not to deviate from the ruling of the Supreme Court, the Court 
of Appeals chose to give effect to the standard by drawing an analogy with the 
principles of “gross negligence” (in contrast to “ordinary negligence”). It 
thereby created a clearer and improved rule, whereby only gross negligence 
would be grounds for liability.123 Nonetheless, the current position in Oregon is 
not clear-cut, and there is no certainty that a child’s action against his parent for 
damages for severe emotional harm (which is not accompanied by physical 
injury), even if caused by gross negligence, will be recognized, and that the 
Burnette outcome would indeed be changed.124 
No state has adopted a positive duty for a parent to love his child.125 
B. Critique 
Considering that American law has, at least until recently, favored 
immunity against tort claims by children against their parents even in cases of 
serious abuse, it is no wonder that the state of Oregon barred actions for 
emotional neglect. Despite considering and weighing the various considerations 
in the Burnette case – and declaring in the dissenting opinion that the doctrine of 
parental immunity should be rescinded – the court did not free itself from the 
fetters of the parental immunity doctrine. 
The “reasonable and prudent parent” standard has been subject to criticsm 
because it does not provide objective tools for determining what is permitted and 
 
 120. Haley, supra note 6, at 596, n.108. 
 121. Winn v. Gilroy, 681 P.2d 776, 783-85 (Or. 1984) (The judgment was written by Justice Linde, who 
was in the minority in the Burnette case, and recognized a claim against a father who drove while drunk 
and negligently caused the death of his two daughters in the resulting automobile accident. The court 
emphasized that in each case the conduct of a parent had to be examined on its merits and no sweeping 
immunity applied.). This case provided a highly suitable platform for abandoning the doctrine and 
establishing an alternative to it, as it was one of many cases which did not involve the parent in his 
parental capacity but in his capacity as a driver. This was particularly true following the spread of the 
Wisconsin rule of 1963, which, as noted, applied the doctrine to matters within the scope of parental 
authority only. 
 122. Martin v. Yunker, 853 P.2d 1332 (Or. Ct. App. 1993). 
 123. Id. at 1335. This was done in other cases too. See, e.g., Foldi v. Jeffries, 461 A.2d 1145 (N.J. 
1983); Chaffin v. Chaffin, 397 P.2d 771 (Or. 1964). 
 124. See, e.g., Hammond v. Cent. Lane Commc’ns Ctr., 816 P.2d 593 (Or. 1991) (In this case, which 
did not concern parent-child relations, the court emphasized that emotional distress which is not 
accompanied by physical damage would not be recognized as subject to compensation if its origins 
were in negligence only.). 
 125. See, e.g., Aboussie v. Aboussie, 270 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) (stating that a parent 
cannot be sued for loss of his society, love, companionship, and guidance); Kane v. Quigley, 203 
N.E.2d 338 (Ohio 1964) (stating that this kind of obligation may be moral but not legal); cf. Comment, 
The Rights of Children: A Trust Model, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 669, 731-32 (1978). 
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what is prohibited when raising children.126 This is a valid criticism and it would be 
appropriate to establish at least general guidelines delineating the boundaries of 
acceptable parental behavior in order to ensure legal certainty. The goal of this 
standard is correct – to establish a separate rule unique to parental conduct within 
the general system of negligence law; however, it would seem that the execution is 
flawed, since the elements of prudence and reasonableness are aspects of the 
general tort of negligence. The “reasonable and prudent parent” standard is merely 
a standard of ordinary negligence law, which is adapted to apply to the professional 
or personal status of the defendant; in this case, the parent. Accordingly, it is 
difficult to see how this standard resolves the difficulties raised by the fundamental 
dilemma. 
The standard which relies on the Restatement provides an intermediate 
path between use of the doctrine of parental immunity and its sweeping 
abrogation. It may be assumed that the ultimate outcome of using this standard 
will not be very different from the outcome of using the parental immunity 
doctrine in its constricted form. According to the qualified doctrine, parental 
immunity is the rule while the exceptions will lead to the imposition of liability. 
The Restatement standard takes the converse approach: the parent’s civil 
liability is the rule, with the exceptions affording him immunity. 
This model does not provide a suitable solution to the fundamental 
dilemma, because of its vagueness. The Restatement standard takes a special 
approach towards the family which is not as extreme as that which is found in 
Roman law or old American law, but even its implementation is problematic 
because it does not set sufficient guidelines. Still, this model has expressly 
excluded cases of parental authority from immunity, and in so doing has taken a 
step, if only a hesitant one, in the direction of delineating the boundaries of a 
recognizable claim. 
Likewise, the basic rule underlying this model cannot provide a bridge 
between the various considerations for and against recognition of the claim, as it 
does not provide a suitable means for giving effect to the rights of the child. 
V. THE STRINGENT-SWEEPING LEGAL INTERVENTION MODEL: APPLICATION OF 
PREVAILING GENERAL LAW TO THE FAMILY 
A. Israeli Law: Recognition of Emotional Neglect as a Ground for a Tort Law 
Claim Against a Parent 
In Israel, also a common law country, the door has always been open for a 
child to bring a civil claim against a parent because Israel never developed a 
doctrine of parental immunity.127 This open stance is consistent with the 
interpretation of the provisions of the constitutinal statute : Basic Law, Human 
Dignity and Freedom of 1992, which is applied to minor children.128 There are 
 
 126. See Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595, 602-04 (Minn. 1980) (Rogosheske J., dissenting); 
Haley, supra note 6, at 595-96. 
 127. CA 193/49 Perlstein v. Nomberg, abstract 49 (1949) Piskei Din (IsrSC); Gad Tadeski, On Tort 
Law in Birth Cases, ESSAYS ON LAW 269, 272 (1978) (Isr.). 
 128. CA 6106/92 Anon. v. The Attorney General (1994) Tak-El 94(2) 1166; Aharon Barak, 
INTERPRETATION IN LAW – CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 435 (Vol. C, 1994) (Isr.). 
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obstacles to recognition of such a claim, however: general protection of a parent 
accorded by the Legal Capacity and Guardianship Law129 (hereinafter LCGL) 
against civil claims and inherent problems with the recognition of the 
independent locus standi of a child in court. 
The legal framework which regulates the relations between parents and 
their minor children and which defines their rights and obligations is the LCGL. 
This statute provides for a parent’s civil liability for damage caused to the child 
if the former fails to act in good faith or does not act in the best interests of the 
child.130 
The case law has held that protection of the child’s best interests is a 
supreme principle in the application of LCGL, including when the court is 
interpreting the defenses accorded to the parent.131 Accordingly, it would be 
difficult for a parent who has emotionally neglected his child to claim protection 
by virtue of the statute, as it would be difficult to argue that neglect—in contrast 
to other parental behaviors, such as corporal punishment—is in the child’s best 
interests. 
With regard to a child’s claim in court, the Family Court Law was enacted 
in 1995132 and provides in Section 3(d) that a child can file an independent claim 
or application by himself or through an amicus curiae, or make an application 
through a claim instituted by another, in any matter where his rights may have 
been seriously infringed. By virtue of Section 1(2) of the Law, these matters 
include civil claims within the family. Therefore, this procedure is only available 
where the emotional neglect causes the child serious harm. 
Tort lawsuits against parents on the grounds of sexual or physical abuse 
have been acknowledged.133 Consequently, the question is whether emotional 
neglect is serious enough to provide a civil cause of action against a parent. Prior 
 
 129. Capacity and Guardianship Law, 5722-1962, 16 LSI 106 (5722-1961/62) (Isr.). 
 130. The relevant duties of the parents, who are the natural guardians of the child, are found in §§ 
14, 15 & 17 of the statute. § 22 provides that the parents shall not be liable for injury caused by them to 
the minor in the exercise of their duties as guardians except where they acted otherwise than in good 
faith or without proper intent for the best interests of the minor. It follows that § 22 in effect establishes 
civil liability of the parent for the injury to the child if the parent does not act in accordance with these 
standards and criteria. Note that LCGL does not establish sanctions for violation of the duties set out 
therein. Accordingly, it is not possible to bring an action solely by virtue of the statute, but a plaintiff 
must use a tort of breach of a statutory duty in order to do so. See Civil Wrongs Ordinance (New 
Version), 5732-1972, 2 LSI 12, § 63 (1972) (Isr.). The standards which have been set in the LCGL and the 
case law stemming from it have had a direct impact on the tort of negligence, as they provide the 
standard for the breach of the duty of care, which is one of the cumulative elements of the tort of 
negligence. Id. at §§ 35-36; see CA 2034/98 Amin v. Amin (1999) (IsrSC) 53(5) 69, paras. 14, 19, available at 
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/98/340/020/q07/98020340.q07.htm (last visited July 18, 2009); 
CF. (TA) 1016/88 Amin v. Amin (1997) Tak-Mech 97(2) 330. 
 131. CA 549/75 Anon v. The Attorney General (1995) (IsrSC) 30(1) 459, para. 7; FH. 7015/94 The 
Attorney General v. Anon (1995) (IsrSC) 50(1) 48, 66, 95-100; CA 458/79 Nir v. Nir (1980) (IsrSC) 
35(1) 518, 523-24. 
 132. Family Law Court 1995, S.H. 1537, 393. 
 133. See, e.g., FamC (Jer) 2160/99 L. v. L. (2005) (not yet published, August 31, 2005); FamC 
(Krayot) 1330/01 A. v. Roe (2009) (not yet published, June 4, 2009); FamC (TA) 2880/00 M.P. v. Y.S. 
(2003) (not yet published, June 11, 2003). 
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to 1999, there was almost no instance of this, apart from dicta in the case law 
regarding custody and adoption of children.134 
In 1999 the Israeli Supreme Court was the first to recognize such a claim in 
Amin v. Amin.135 But it all began in 1988, when a civil claim was brought by three 
adult siblings in the District Court of Tel Aviv.136 The girl and two boys, all of 
whom were in their twenties, had lost their mother when she committed suicide 
shortly after the birth of the youngest son.137 The claim was brought against the 
father by his children, for damages for emotional injury caused to them in their 
youth as a result of the father’s violation of the his duties as a parent. They 
alleged that he failed to satisfy their emotional needs, in addition to failure to 
meet their material needs, such as food, clothing, and education. The father did 
not participate in raising the children, neglected them, repudiated them, was 
alienated from them, actively denied paternity, and in practice abandoned them. 
The children lived for a short time in their impoverished grandmother’s home 
(which was also the home of their uncle – a mentally retarded man) before being 
moved by the welfare services to boarding schools. The children were separated 
and over the years moved from one foster home and institution to another until 
they reached the age of majority.138 Four years after the mother committed 
suicide, the father remarried, and entered into a written agreement with his new 
wife under which they both undertook not to bring their children from their 
previous marriages into the new marital home, in order to open a new page in 
their lives. Two children were born to the new couple.139 
The father’s children from his first marriage sought emotional warmth 
from the father in vain.140 When they came to his home he expelled them with 
shouts, and also disapproved of their visits to their grandmother’s home. Even 
after they became adults the father did not bother to visit them and did not 
show any interest in their lives.141 In the meantime, the children all developed 
serious problems.142 All efforts by welfare services to involve the father in the 
 
 134. It was held that satisfying emotional duties was also important under the LCGL, and 
included the positive duty of love. Indeed, statements that a parent is under a duty to show 
affection, love, and softness towards his children for the purpose of parental custody were made in a 
number of cases, but all of them in regard to guardianship and adoption. CA 549/75 Anon v. The 
Attorney General (1995) (IsrSC) 30(1) 459, para. 7; CA 845/76 Anon. v. Attorney General (1977) 
(IsrSC) 32(1) 128; CA 783/81, Applic. 228/83 Anon. v. Anon. (1983) (IsrSC) 39(2) 1, 8; FamC (Jer) 
14622/97 Anon. v. Anon. (1998) Tak-Mish. 98(3) 19; see also Avner Hai Shaki, A Re-examination of the 
Nature of the Parents' Right to Custody of their Minor Children, 9 IUNEI MISHPAT 59, 98 (1983) (Isr.); 
Avner Hai Shaki, Trends in Custody of Minor Children – with Emphasis on the Implementation of the 
Principle of the Best Interest of the Child, 10 IUNEI MISHPAT 5, 15 (1984) (Isr.); Pinhas Shifman, Parent 
Against his Will – Misrepresentation in relation to the use of Prophylactics, 18 MISHPATIM 459, 461-62 
(1989) (Isr.); Shulamit Almog, RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 58 (1997) (Isr.). 
 135. CA 2034/98 Amin v. Amin (1999) (IsrSC) 53(5) 69. 
 136. CF (TA) 1016/88 Amin v. Amin (1997) Tak-Mech 97(2) 330. 
 137. CA 2034/98 Amin v. Amin (1999) IsrSC 53(5) 69, para. 1 (opinion of Englard, J.). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at para. 2. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. The children ran away from the institutions and foster families in which they were placed, often 
created disturbances, and were found wandering the streets. “One son started a family but was unable to 
work and lived off monthly National Insurance payments. The other son wandered from job to job, unable 
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care and support of the children failed.143 The father did not even respond to 
invitations sent by the children to visit on their birthdays,144 and the children’s 
complaint against him, as described by the court, was that: 
The tragedy of the children passes from generation to generation. 
In their bitterness and distress, the sons and daughter point accusatory fingers at 
their father; he turned his back on them throughout their childhood and youth 
and continues to do so today. The children sought and pleaded for fatherly 
attention, for a modicum of warmth and concern and care, and for any measure 
of interest in them and in their lives from their father, but they hit a brick wall. 
The severance was intentional and absolute. . . . Their eyes full of yearning, the 
children watched how the father showered his love on the two sons born to him 
by his second wife and ensured their education. And they were neglected and 
left to care for themselves!145 
The claim was based on two torts: negligence, on the ground that the father 
had not conducted himself as a reasonable parent would, and breach of a 
statutory duty set out in §§ 15 and 17 of the LCGL, which include directives 
regarding the appropriate behavior of a parent towards his child. The plaintiffs 
proved that they had suffered from emotional injury and personality 
disturbances amounting to mental injury and that there was a causal connection 
between these injuries and the absence of parental support and the active cruelty 
of their father towards them. 
The father argued that after the suicide of his first wife, he found himself in 
a dire economic and mental state which almost caused him to lose his ability to 
function, and that as a result he was unable to take care of his children.146 
The District Court of Tel Aviv held that a parent has a legal obligation to 
take care of the needs of his children, including their emotional and mental 
needs, and that a child can bring a civil claim against his parent if these duties 
have not been fulfilled.147 The court held that the intentional acts of the father 
can be included in the tort of negligence.148 Accordingly, the claim was upheld, 
and the District Court awarded damages.149 
The father appealed to the Supreme Court. He did not dispute the factual 
conclusions of the District Court, but chose to attack the submission of the suit, the 
like of which had never been recognized in the world.150 He argued that his acts or 
omissions in the emotional domain, even if immoral, did not give rise to any legal 
liability, and certainly not in the civil arena (in contrast to failure to satisfy material 
needs).151 Accordingly, he argued that the claim had to be set aside by virtue of the 
 
to keep a place of employment for long. The daughter married and divorced: the eldest was given up for 
adoption, and the others were put in group homes; their mother’s drug abuse renders her unable to 
care for them.” Id. at para. 1. 
 143. Id. at para. 3. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at paras. 1-2. 
 146. Id. at para. 7. 
 147. CF (TA) 1016/88 Amin v. Amin (1997) Tak-Mech 97(2) 330, para. 41. 
 148. Id. at para. 117a. 
 149. Id. at para. 122. 
 150. CA 2034/98 Amin v. Amin (1999) (IsrSC) 53(5) 69, para. 7 (opinion of Englard, J.). 
 151. Id. 
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court’s inability to enforce a duty which should be confined to the moral arena.152 
The father also asserted that upholding the claim would lead to a slippery slope and 
the courts would be flooded with similar claims, and consequently that it should be 
denied on grounds of judicial policy.153 
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the District Court and held 
that the father had breached his parental duties as laid out in the LCGL, which 
also applied in the emotional and mental spheres, and which existed in the legal 
domain and not only in the moral domain.154 The court held that the father 
could not enjoy the defenses afforded by the statute.155 
The Supreme Court produced a world precedent in recognizing this type of 
claim, as the court itself pointed out.156 This ruling entails an even greater 
innovation than would appear at first glance. Not only does the ruling apply to 
the treatment of children by their biological parents, but because according to 
the Israeli statute dealing with adoption, the duty to satisfy the needs of a child 
applies to any person who has custody of a child, these duties can provide the 
basis for claims by an adopted child against his adoptive parents as well.157 The 
Amin case also introduced an innovation in the opposite direction. In effect, the 
court held that the duty found in the LCGL to satisfy the needs of the child 
applied to a biological parent even when the child was not in his custody or 
under his care. 
The Court emphasized the extreme circumstances of the case, both in order 
to lessen the fear of the slippery slope argument and in order to allow a certain 
measure of flexibility regarding the question of what is included in the legal 
duty of a parent towards his child. Nonetheless, the court’s ruling is clear and 
definite. Still, in order to ease fears of sliding down the slippery slope, the court 
formed a three-way solution in the shape of what it termed the “safety valves” 
which would help to categorize the various claims children might bring against 
their parents:158 (1) if the defense set out in § 22 of the LCGL (acting in the best 
interests of the child) is fulfilled, the lawsuit is rejected; (2) if the act was de 
minimis,159 the lawsuit is rejected; and (3) the need to accept this kind of lawsuit 
only in limited and very special circumstances, like the Amin case, in order to 
prevent the flooding of the courts. 
Does the Amin court’s decision create a positive duty for a parent to love 
his child, or only a negative duty not to neglect him? The District Court held 
that the claim did not deal with the lack of love or its insufficient quantity. The 
claim was in respect to the father’s severe rejection of the children, his complete 
disregard for them, the severance of any connection with them, and the absence 
of any parental support.160 The Supreme Court clarified that it did not intend to 
 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at para. 8. 
 155. Id. at paras. 10-15. 
 156. Id. at introduction. 
 157. Adoption Law, 1981, S. H. 1981 29 §§ 16, 35. 
 158. CA 2034/98 Amin v. Amin (1999) (IsrSC) 53(5) 69, paras. 17, 19, 21. 
 159. Civil Wrongs Ordinance (New Version), 5732-1972, 2 LSI 12, § 4 (1972) (Isr.). 
 160. CF (TA) 1016/88 Amin v. Amin (1997) Tak-Mech 97(2) 330, para. 39. 
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go so far as to establish a positive legal duty to love the child, as this was outside 
the limited capacity of the court.161 The Court could only examine the damage 
caused to the child as a result of the parent’s failure to satisfy his material and 
emotional needs. 
B. Critique 
The Amin case was a groundbreaking ruling; no comparative precedent 
existed. Though the decision in this case was undoubtedly justified in view of 
the Amin family’s tragic and difficult circumstances, serious consideration must 
be given to the future ramifications of this ruling, both in Israel and other 
countries that might adopt a similar rule. 
This ruling embodies an individualistic approach, which implements the 
model of stringent-sweeping intervention in parent-child relations. However, 
the desire to regulate the relations between child and parent within a framework 
similar to that of private law, rather than treating the family unit as a special, 
discrete entity, is sometimes counterproductive. The general principles of tort 
law were established to deal with conflicts and enmities between two strangers 
and some are not appropriate in the family framework. Principles of corrective 
justice, for example, only take into account the two parties to the dispute, but in 
an intrafamilial dispute the two parties do not exist in a vacuum, and the 
remaining members of the family unit are not “strangers” to the situation. 
Accordingly, it is necessary to set criteria for determining when intervention in 
parent-child relations is appropriate, rather than relying on future cases being 
similar to the Amin case to make such a determination. It would have been best 
if the Amin court had established criteria for determining when to recognize a 
child’s civil claim, particularly because Israel follows the common law, where 
such a ruling creates a binding precedent. 
Despite the Supreme Court’s attempt to “quiet” fears about the slippery 
slope by stating that the de minimis rule would limit recognition of the claims, 
there are too many cases that lie between harsh and extreme circumstances on 
the one hand and de minimis circumstances on the other. Justice Theodor Orr 
concurred with the opinion of Justice Englard, who wrote the main judgment, 
but also addressed this issue in a more comprehensive manner: 
Counsel for the appellant expressed his concern that recognizing the right 
of the respondents to compensation from their father for the emotional harm 
caused to them would lead the court down a slippery slope. . . . 
Indeed, there is no doubt that the relationship between parents and children is 
often complex and emotionally-laden. It is not immune from frustrations, 
disappointments, and disillusionment, whether mutual or one-sided, which are 
likely to give rise to the feeling that one side has not fulfilled his or her duties 
with the appropriate amount of dedication. The court, therefore, should be 
doubly cautious in addressing these issues, and must take care not to intrude 
unnecessarily upon this delicate fabric of relations. It must not clear the way for 
a wave of tort claims of children against parents, claims which are based in 
complex life circumstances which are difficult to judge in retrospect. Parents are 
not immune from errors in judgment during the course of such a long and 
 
 161. CA 2034/98 Amin v. Amin (1999) (IsrSC) 53(5) 69, paras. 8, 10. 
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complicated relationship. The court must exercise appropriate caution in 
drawing the line delineating when it will intervene by recognizing a cause of 
action in tort by a child against his or her parent. Appropriate judicial policy 
dictates that only in extreme cases will parents’ acts or omissions rise to the level 
of the negligence sufficient to sustain a tort claim against them.162 
These comments express an appropriate approach which emphasizes a 
balanced, moderate, and considered policy of legal intervention, one which is not 
sweeping in nature. Accordingly, especially in a common law country where 
rulings like the Amin court’s create a binding precedent, we might have expected 
the court to establish criteria in order to draw a distinction and create a boundary 
between harsh cases in which the circumstances are special and rare, and other 
cases. Justice Orr explains their failure to establish such boundaries: 
The case at bar does not require us to delineate where the line falls. The 
circumstances of this case are so extreme in their severity, the question of where 
to draw the line does not arise at all. 
This is not the ordinary case requiring us to evaluate how a parent exercised his 
or her judgment. The appellant shirked all his parental duties completely and 
harshly. He simply abandoned his children and ignored their existence. His 
behavior is particularly harsh in light of the fact that the children had already 
been orphaned of their mother. Even worse: this case shocks the conscience in 
particular because of the fact that his children watched him establish a new 
family, which he nurtured and of which he took care. His children watched him 
do this from afar, while they yearned for him. The circumstances of this case are 
unique, and our recognition of the rights of the respondents to damages under 
the circumstances should not be seen as opening the floodgate to suits by 
children against their parents for every case of inappropriate behavior by 
parents toward their children. Indeed, ordinarily, parents are entitled to the 
defense imparted by Section 22 of the law of Legal Capacity and Guardianship 
Law.163 
Indeed, these were harsh and unique circumstances, and the sense of 
justice “declares” that the claim should have been recognized. Yet how will it be 
possible to decide henceforth when a tort claim against a parent will be 
recognized and when it will not? What will happen, for example, when similar 
conduct is directed at children who have not been orphaned? The judges have 
relied upon the extreme nature of the case as an excuse for not establishing 
criteria which can be implemented as a matter of law in the future. How then 
can one prevent a slide down the slippery slope? Is it really possible to rely on 
the very general protection given by § 22 of the LCGL? It would seem that the 
court itself did not rely solely on this section. Had it done so, it would have 
dismissed the claim. Therefore, what is the “normal case” which will fall within 
the protection of § 22? Justice Orr stated that: 
[C]ourt[s] will have to delineate rules which will, on the one hand, allow 
children, in appropriate cases, to claim compensation from their parents for 
emotional harm, and on the other hand, recognize that a parent’s judgment 
enjoys an autonomy which should not be unnecessarily infringed upon. In any 
 
 162. CA 2034/98 Amin v. Amin (1999) (IsrSC) 53(5) 69 (opinion of Orr, J.). 
 163. Id. 
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event, the question is beyond the scope of the case before us, and so we will 
leave a discussion of the issue, with all the problems it raises, until such time as 
it becomes necessary to adjudicate it. 164 
“[C]ourt[s] will have to delineate rules,” 165 but the Amin court refused to 
do so, and here is the heart of the problem. The moment the comments were 
written by the court they became subject to interpretation, particularly as the 
issue was not analyzed in sufficient depth (per Justice Orr himself). The judges 
were convinced of the need to create a proper balance between the various 
factors, but they did not draw the guidelines for determining such a balance. 
Thus, they released an important and innovative ruling of global proportions 
without setting clear criteria which might help potential litigants know where 
they stand. 
In practice, the Amin ruling is vague, since it does not differentiate between 
the extreme and rare cases where children should be able to bring civil claims, 
and the more usual cases where they should not. Though it may never be 
possible to perfectly delineate when a child may bring a civil claim against his 
parents, a number of principal criteria must be clarified which can be used to 
guide us in the future. 
Two actions brought before the family courts in Israel since the Amin case, 
which sought to rely on that judgment, were dismissed indicating that the 
floodgates have not been opened.166 The court is “on guard” and clearly in no 
 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. A first attempt to breach the dam took place about six months after judgment was given by 
the Supreme Court in the Amin case, in a case which also dealt with damage caused by emotional 
neglect as the sole damage. See Applic. 3190/00 FamC (Hi) 1620/00 Anon. v. Anon (2001) Tak-Mish 
2001(3) 33. The Family Court in Haifa was presented with a claim filed by children (who lived with 
their mother) against their father for negligence in raising and nurturing them, and for breach of 
statutory duties towards them in a manifest attempt to rely on the ruling of the Amin case. The court 
held that no proof was adduced of any damage as a result of the neglect and no causation had been 
proven between the breach of the parental duties of the defendant father – if there were any – and 
the damage. The court pointed out that the Amin ruling had to be followed gently and very 
cautiously in view of its special and extreme circumstances. The neglect – if any – was not material 
but only emotional; the children had a mother, and the case, as a whole, was less serious and 
centered solely on the question of meetings. 
F.Ct. (Jer) 19286/98 Anon. v. Anon (2001) Tak-Mish 2001(3) 659. A claim was filed by a wife and 
children against the father. The wife sued her husband on the basis of the tort of defamation and 
breach of privacy as a result of notices about her which the father had disseminated throughout the 
neighborhood, which shamed her and maligned her because she had turned to the secular courts of 
the state (the Family Court) for the purpose of obtaining a restraining order against him after he had 
engaged in violent outbursts instead of turning to the private ultra-orthodox courts which she 
should have done in view of their lifestyle. The children, for their part, alleged that this act of the 
father was a breach of his parental duties, and that as a result of his actions, they suffered greatly, 
inter alia, because the neighborhood children refused to visit their homes and they themselves could 
not go out and play freely in the neighborhood park because of bullying by the neighborhood 
children, with the result that their mother was forced to take them to far away parks. They added 
that they suffered because they were ostracized and humiliated, had lost their pleasure in life, their 
social development had been impaired, and their educational achievements had suffered. 
Accordingly, they claimed that the elements of the tort of negligence had been met by the acts of the 
father. They also argued that the father had breached the statutory duties imposed on him by § 29 of 
the LCGL, because he had failed to act in the way that a devoted parent would have acted in the 
circumstances of the matter. The children asked for compensation for damage to their social 
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rush to recognize every child’s claim against his parent, even without clear 
guidelines about when such recognition is appropriate. The facts of these cases 
were very far removed from those of Amin. The circumstances were much easier 
and there was no proof adduced of damage and causation between the parent’s 
conduct and the alleged damage. 
Still, it would appear that the dam has been breached by the very 
submission of additional claims following the Amin case, since there were no 
similar claims submitted before Amin. A more serious effort to breach the dam 
came with the submission of a civil claim (which is still ongoing at the time of 
writing this paper) in the District Court of Jerusalem some two years after the 
judgment in the Amin case, a claim which is similar to the Amin claim, and 
perhaps even more serious.167 
There are many other cases in addition to these three which are potentially 
suitable subject matter for such claims, because they disclose prima facie parental 
emotional neglect. Other cases that have reached criminal and civil courts in 
various forms, with the exception of tort claims, prove that cases of emotional 
neglect are not as rare as one might hope.168 The problem posed by the failure of 
 
development, loss of happiness, damage to their education, aggravation, distress, shame, and 
financial loss because of the cost of traveling to distant parks. The court dismissed the children’s 
claim (and partially accepted the mother’s claim) because no proof had been adduced of the damage 
alleged, and no proof was adduced of causation between the act of publishing the notices and the 
alleged injury to the children’s interests. The court also added that the duties of a parent as a parent 
should not be stretched too far. The facts of this claim too, of course, do not resemble the facts of the 
Amin case. 
 167. CF (Dct. Ct. Jerusalem) 3320/01 Mazor (Sa’ada) v. Avidan (file opened July 2, 2001). The 
case concerns a young man born in 1977 who brought a claim against a number of persons for acts 
committed against him when he was a minor, while he was staying with a foster family, after having 
been abandoned by his biological mother. He alleges that he was the victim of neglect, exploitation, 
humiliation, and physical, mental, and sexual cruelty over many years, and that no one lifted a 
finger to rescue him from this situation, notwithstanding repeated reports of violence and neglect 
submitted by psychologists and welfare officers. Among the defendants is the foster mother who 
beat him, imprisoned him in a dark and empty room for hours, and severely neglected him. 
Likewise, the Ministry of Labor and Welfare is being sued as is as the Department of Social Services 
of the municipality of Rehovot. The neglect was reflected, inter alia, by sloppy, dirty clothing 
unsuitable for the season. After a number of years, when the plaintiff was aged 9, he was transferred 
to a boarding school because the foster mother, who had hardly taken care of his basic physical 
needs, allegedly had had enough of him. The plaintiff alleges, amongst other things, damage which 
is developmental, and includes emotional deprivation and mental distress, inadequate education, 
failure to integrate into decent jobs, and his transformation into a rentboy, who engaged in 
homosexual prostitution. The plaintiff contends that he has been diagnosed as suffering from 
chronic post-traumatic syndrome. Certain aspects of this case, as arises from the statement of claim, 
are more severe than those presented by the Amin case: a foster family is designed to provide a 
refuge for a child, and there he believes he can find the warmth and love which he could not find in 
his biological family. Neglect and beatings, humiliation, and the indignities heaped upon him, 
particularly by the foster family, is like a further knife in the back of the child, because these acts 
convey a message of despair and hopelessness to the child who has now been betrayed for the 
second time in his life. 
 168. Indeed, there is data relating to numerous children who fall victim to emotional abuse. See, 
e.g., Neeley supra note 1, at 716. Below is a random sample of cases in which it is possible to point to 
severe emotional neglect which can provide the platform for a tort claim: FamC (Beer Sheva) 
18030/98 Anon. v. Anon. (1998) (unpublished); Civil A. (TA) 1090/02 G.H. v. D.H. (2003) Tak-Meh 
2003(2) 28716; CA 549/75 Anon v. The Attorney General (1995) (IsrSC) 30(1) 459; CrF (Jer) 606/03 
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the Amin ruling to establish criteria is demonstrated by these additional cases, 
whose facts differ significantly from the facts of the Amin case. So far, there is no 
clear-cut rule and no case law recognizing, for example, claims against a 
divorced, non-custodial father who does not maintain contact with his children, 
cases where the neglect is only emotional, but the parent supports his child 
economically, or cases of severe alienation of unorphaned children who have a 
second parent who meets their emotional and other needs. 
The use of the de minimis defense which was relied upon in the Amin case in 
order to screen the circumstances of the case, only brings us a short way 
forwards. Likewise, the defense provided by § 22 of the LCGL – acting in good 
faith and for the best interest of the child – is not sufficient by itself, as it is 
overly general and leaves too many cases within the gray zone. Actually 
establishing definitive and extensive criteria beyond those set out in the LCGL 
will provide clear answers and lessen the fear of the slippery slope. 
Nonetheless, in the wake of the Amin case, Israeli courts have not been 
flooded with similar suits. If the vagueness of the Amin ruling actually deters 
parents from taking steps which are located within the gray zone because of fear 
of being sued by their children, then ostensibly the stringent-sweeping 
intervention has achieved its goal by generating greater deterrence, which is one 
of the prime objectives of tort law. However, the lack of legal certainty affects 
the child-plaintiff, who cannot assess the chances of his claim being recognized 
in court. 
Yet, establishing the criteria which are lacking, in accordance with the 
balance between the individualistic approach and the family approach, may 
help solve the fundamental dilemma. 
VI. THE SOFT-SWEEPING LEGAL  INTERVENTION MODEL: CREATING A GAP BETWEEN 
SWEEPING DECLARATION AND MODERATE ENFORCEMENT 
A. Jewish Law: Between Fundamental-but-Qualified Recognition of Liability, 
and Human Non-Enforcement 
Jewish law, also known as Halacha, is a religious extra-territorial law which 
applies to Jews all over the world. In Israel it is applied by virtue of statute to 
matters of marriage and divorce only. In every other matter, and in every other 
country, it is not mandated as a matter of state law. The believer acts according 
to Jewish law, though sometimes it is not enforced upon him by human judges 
or enforcement mechanisms, particularly those elements pertaining primarily to 
religion, such as imperatives towards God. Other times the religious law is 
enforced, particularly those aspects concerning relations between people, such 
as torts and contracts, which have practical purposes outside of their religious 
roots. 
The question of whether Jewish law permits a child to bring a civil claim of 
emotional abuse against his parent requires a two step examination. First, one 
must examine whether a child can actually sue his parent under this system of 
law. Then, one must examine the cause of action by investigating whether there 
 
State of Israel v. Anon (2004) (unpublished); Cr.F. (Jer) 1233/00 State of Israel v. Gazawwi (2002) 
(unpublished). 
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is a known Jewish law mechanism that can be used to justify allowing children 
to sue their parents for emotional neglect. 
Jewish law recognizes a claim brought by a child against his parents and 
does not allow for parental immunity. The Jewish law of damages imposes 
liability on a person who has injured another person and awards monetary 
compensation for the injury, making no distinction between whether the injured 
person is a child or adult.169 Indeed, the dynamics of Jewish law show that 
students have sued their teachers for causing them injury.170 Most Jewish law 
sources do not distinguish between the parent and the teacher, because the 
authority of the teacher derives from a relationship of agency, express or 
implied, imposed on him by the parent. Yet, one cannot find claims for damages 
brought by children against their parents. This is because, notwithstanding the 
agency relationship, and despite the analogy between a parent and teacher, a 
child’s claim against his parent is more complex and must take into account 
additional considerations. 
Certainly, Halachic sources contain debates about child-parent disputes.171 
However, these sources do not  refer to tort claims for damages, but instead rely 
on family law duties of financial support, etc. It would seem that this is not 
coincidental. Jewish law does not encourage the institution of such tort 
claims172—it seeks to identify alternative courses of action out of an 
unwillingness to compromise the family unit and a desire to protect the respect 
due to the parent and the interests of the child himself. The preservation of the 
dignity of the parent and his authority is a supreme value in Judaism, and 
respect for one’s mother and father is one of the Ten Commandments.173 The 
parents of a child are regarded as partners with God in the child’s creation.174 
If the child decides to sue his parents under Jewish law, he will be subject 
to a system of qualifications and limitations which have developed over the 
years. First, the Jewish law Sages and adjudicators took care to ensure the 
dignity of the woman. A child can sue his father,175 but it is considered 
inappropriate for him to sue his mother in court because she will suffer more 
indignity than the father,176 and to sue one’s mother would be a definitive 
transgression of the commandment to honor one’s mother and father. If, 
nevertheless the child sues his mother (or his mother sues him) and the parties 
reside in different places, the child must go to her when bringing the suit and 
 
 169. PINHAS KEHATI, THE MISHNAH, Seder Nezikin Vol. 1: BAVA KAMMA/BAVA METZIA, BAVA 
KAMMA 8:4, 117-18 (Avner Tomaschoff ed., Edward Levin trans. Department For Torah Education 
and Culture in the Diaspora, Jerusalem, 1994). 
 170. See, e.g., Resp. Shvut Ya’akov, Choshen Mishpat 3:140, and Resp. Kiryat Hannah #22 of R. 
Gershon Koblentz, in NATANEL WEIL, SEFER TORAT NETANEL: TSHUVOT GEONEI ASHKENAZ (1991, 
originally published in 1785). 
 171. See, e.g., Rema on Shulchan Arukh, Yore De’a 240:8. 
 172. See, e.g., YEHUDAH HECHASID, SEFER CHASIDIM: THE BOOK OF THE PIOUS §584, 150 (Avraham 
Ya'akov Finkel ann. & trans., 1997). 
 173. Exodus 20:11; Deuteronomy 5:15. 
 174. TALMUD BAVLI, Niddah 31a, Tractate Niddah Vol. 1, 31a2 (Yisroel Simcha Schorr ed., 
Mesorah Publications, 2d ed., 2d prtg. 2005); TALMUD BAVLI, Kiddushin 30b, Tractate Kiddushin Vol. 
1, 30b4 (Hersh Goldwurm ed., Mesorah Publications, 5th ed. 2005). 
 175. Resp. Rif 92. 
 176. Resp. Ktav Sofer, Yore De’a 107. 
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not trouble her to come to him.177 In addition, it is permitted to file a claim only 
in cases of real damage and impoverishment, and not in cases of loss of profit 
only.178 Likewise, according to certain opinions, no claim may be brought for 
damages ensuing from an educational relationship.179 The law also directs the 
child to engage in the briefest practicable proceedings in view of the need to 
maintain the honor of the parent and to limit the humiliation which will arise 
from the very existence of the suit. Accordingly, within the framework of these 
proceedings, only what is essential for the hearing must be included.180 Further, 
if the parent takes an oath during the course of the hearing, he must not be 
compelled to take the most serious type of oath.181 
Finally, there is a qualification called the “animosity ground”: a person 
who beats his minor child is liable, particularly if the child is not dependent on 
the father.182 The rationale behind this qualification is that if the son is 
dependent on the father, imposition of a duty on the father to pay his son would 
not have any real meaning, because the father in any event enjoys the benefit of 
the assets of the son. Those who look at this caveat in a different light argue that 
the fundamental purpose of allowing children to bring claims against their 
parents is to restore peace and harmony to the family unit. Therefore, although a 
child should not be beaten excessively, it is unacceptable to recognize a claim 
against a parent if it will further disrupt the family harmony, even though such 
a claim is justified.183 If the parent were to be tried in such a case, this would 
cause him to feel animosity and hatred towards his child, and as a result the 
parent might no longer support his child. 
This approach reflects a practical perspective, even if it is somewhat 
paternalistic, that the basic rights of the child may be damaged by this animosity 
to the extent that he might lose the financial support of his parents or even be 
expelled from the house. It may be assumed that the restriction relating to 
dependence on the father applies not only to damage caused by beatings, but 
also to every other type of damage as well. It should be noted that this 
qualification only refers to minor children, whereas a person who injures his 
older children is liable,184 probably because an older child is no longer 
dependent on his father. If the financial dependency on the father is indeed the 
reason underlying the Halachic rule, then one can assume that when this 
presumption is contradicted in practice, and the older child is still dependent on 
the father, the animosity principle will continue to apply, perhaps even more 
 
 177. Resp. Maharik 58. 
 178. Rema on Shulchan Arukh, Yore De’a 240:8. 
 179. Uri Dasberg, Education is No Law, 8 TCHUMIN 199 (1987). 
 180. Resp. Ktav Sofer, Yore De’a 107. 
 181. MAIMONIDES, Rebels 5:15, THE CODE OF MAIMONIDES – BOOK FOURTEEN: THE BOOK OF JUDGES 
153 (Abraham M. Hershman trans., Yale University Press 1949). This instruction is meant for the 
judges. 
 182. MAIMONIDES, CODE, Laws of Chovel U’Mezik 4:19. 
 183. RAMBAN, MILHAMOT HASHEM, Baba Kama 86:2. 
 184. Liable, in principle, for all five kinds of torts (damage – evaluation of the monetary loss 
caused as a result of the victim’s inability to perform certain work; pain – estimation of the pain 
according to clear guidelines; medical expenses; incapacitation – loss of work days; and shame 
(mental anguish)). See Tosefta Bava Kama (Lieberman) 9:8 & 9:10. 
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forcibly, because in most scholars’ view the father is not under a legal obligation 
to support his older child. 
One possible solution to the problem of a dependant child suing his parent 
may be to use a legal device that vests the cause of action in another, who will 
conduct the proceedings in the name of the child,185 similar to the modern legal 
concept of assigning rights. This course of action may be suitable in certain cases 
in order to avoid direct conflict between the child and his parent and in order to 
solve the animosity problem. But this is not a magical solution, since it is not 
clear that it will cause the animosity between parties to disappear, nor will it 
negate the practical risk of the father expelling the child from his home. 
However, assigning rights may be useful both in preserving the dignity of the 
father and preventing him from the disgrace of being legally confronted by his 
child. Naturally, the parent knows that the child stands behind the suit, but 
conduct of the proceedings by another will blunt the animosity which arises 
from direct contact. Clearly it is not possible to evade some confrontation, such 
as would arise from the testimony of the child, and therefore the solution is only 
partially effective. 
Thus, Jewish law in principle allows a civil claim to be brought by a child 
against his parent, particularly his father, but it limits the circumstances under 
which such a claim may be brought by stringent substantive and procedural 
conditions. 
Now to the question of the cause of action. Is it possible to sue for 
emotional neglect? Jewish law imposes a series of obligations on parents to their 
children. In particular, it strongly emphasizes the obligation of the father to 
supply the material, educational, and spiritual needs of his child.186 The duty to 
educate the child is presented as the most important commandment in this 
context.187 Accordingly, Jewish law strongly disapproves of emotional neglect, 
which is perceived as the opposite of an investment in education and care for 
the child; indeed, there are those who perceive a failure to display compassion 
towards the child as an intolerable wrong.188 
However, Jewish law goes a step further and imposes a positive duty of 
love on every person towards the other, and includes in this principle a parent’s 
love towards his child, as a product of the imperative: “love your neighbour as 
yourself.”189 This imperative, which was established by Rabbi Akiva, and which 
he stated to be “a great principle of the Torah,”190 is an imperative on the 
Halachic legal plane and not only on the moral plane. This imperative has 
numerous elements, and in effect amounts to a blanket principle. Some of the 
duties making up the rule are negative in nature, such as the rule embodied in 
the saying of Hillel, “[D]on’t do to others what you would not want done to 
 
 185. Sefer She’elot U’Teshuvot Ha’Geonim #300 at 82 (1960). 
 186. TALMUD BAVLI, Kiddushin 29a, Tractate Kiddushin Vol. 1, 29a2 (Hersh Goldwurm ed., 
Mesorah Publications, 5th ed. 2005). 
 187. Reference is both to education in observing the commandments and compliance with basic 
qualities of conduct, such as respect for one’s parents or conduct in society. See R. AHARON HALEVI, 
SEFER HA-CHINUKH, Mitzva 419. 
 188. RABBI YEHUDAH HA-CHASSID, SEFER CHASSIDIM,  § 155, at 316-17. 
 189. Leviticus 19:18. 
 190. Safra, Kdoshim, 2:4. 
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yourself, this is the entire Torah, and the remaining details go and study,”191 the 
message of which is to refrain from doing wrong.192 The duty not to emotionally 
neglect one’s child can be derived from the general rule of Hillel to refrain from 
doing wrong, which is apparently perceived as easier to achieve than a positive 
duty of love.193 The various specific imperatives making up the rule “love your 
neighbor as yourself”194 (hereinafter “the rule”) have the manifest purpose of 
creating and building a man’s love for his neighbor, even if only in stages. This 
comes out of the understanding that without these specific imperatives it would 
be difficult to instill this love in the heart of man (a parent is subject to 
additional imperatives beyond love for a stranger).195 
It seems that the imperative to love in Jewish law is, in effect, an imperative 
to develop qualities of love and not necessarily a feeling of love. Qualities belong 
to the power of the will and the soul, which also contain envy, hatred, avarice, 
lust, and more. That quality of the soul has an external emotional manifestation, 
but its basis is in the will, and the assumption is that a person can improve his 
qualities, and build and better himself by means of the mind, without denying 
the difficulties posed by emotion. Feelings, on the other hand, are impossible to 
control.196 Thus, it is possible to develop love by means of action. 
It follows from various principles of Jewish law that the imperative to love 
is applicable to every human being, young and old, whether in its positive 
aspect of love the neighbor or in its negative aspect of refraining from harming 
him.197 The rule also applies to the parent-child relationship.198 Accordingly, it 
would seem that love for a child stems from a positive duty which is derived 
 
 191. TALMUD BAVLI, Shabbos 31a, Tractate Shabbos Vol. 1, 31a2 (Yisroel Simcha Schorr and 
Chaim Malinowitz eds., Mesorah Publications, 3d ed., 2nd prtg. 2005) ("That which is hateful to you, 
do not do to your fellow; this, in a few words, is the entire Torah; all the rest is but an elaboration of 
this one, central point. Now, go and learn it."). 
 192. For this interpretation, see Smag (Sefer Mitzvot Gdolot), Mitzvat Aseh 9; Chiddushei Harim 
on the Torah, at 183. 
 193. Different approaches exist regarding the relationship between the rule made by Rabbi 
Akiva and the rule offered by Hillel, and in my opinion, the two statements are largely two sides of 
the same coin, where one deals with positive duties of love and the other with negative duties of 
refraining from wrongdoing. One should not reject the possibility that there is a hierarchy between 
these two rules, where “love your neighbor” is more difficult to achieve and “do not do” is easier to 
achieve; however, it seems that both are normative in Jewish law. 
 194. Such as compassion, charity, giving clothing to the naked, raising orphans, the need to bring 
happiness to a bride and groom, comforting the bereaved, and dozens of similar imperatives. 
 195. Bearing in mind the adage “the heart follows the action.” HALEVI, supra note 187, Mitzva 16. 
 196. See RAMBAM, SHEMONAH PRAKIM (Eight Chapters) (Jerusalem, 1972) chapter 1, at 9 & 12, 
and chapter 2, at 14. 
 197. See, e.g., TALMUD BAVLI, Nedarim 40a, Tractate Nedarim Vol. 1, 40a1 (Mesorah Publications 
2000) (describing the duty to visit sick persons, even little children); Maimonides, Discernment 6:8, 
The Book of Knowledge: from the Mishnah Torah of Maimonides 46 (H.M. Russel and J. Weinberg 
trans, The Royal College of Physicians of Edinburgh 1981) (the prohibition to shame in public, even 
little children). 
 198. The Talmud deals with the question whether a child can and is perhaps required to spill his 
father’s blood for the purpose of healing him, as derived from the rule, at least according to the 
approaches of Rav Matna and Rashi. TALMUD BAVLI, Sanhedrin 84b, Tractate Sanhedrin Vol. 3, 84b3-4 
(Yisroel Simcha Schorr ed., Mesorah Publications, 2d ed. 2002). Possibly one can also learn of the 
duty to love a parent from the a fortiori rule, from the fact that the Sages imposed an express duty on 
the teacher to love the student. See Maimonides, supra note 197, at 63. 
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from the rule, as an imperative relating to the heart and feelings, whereas the 
prohibition on neglecting him stems from the negative duty. There are those 
who expressly declared that parents, and the father in particular, are obliged to 
take care both of the material needs and the emotional or spiritual needs of the 
child, at least until the child reaches the age of majority and is able to take care 
of these needs by himself.199 The rule is also important in relation to the raising 
of orphans, like the children of the Amin family.200 
However, this does not bring an end to the discussion. Some of the 613 
imperatives in Jewish law are not enforceable by man—if a person does not 
abide by them, they cannot be enforced nor can he be brought to justice in an 
earthly court, because there is no human sanction that applies for these laws.201 
Those who violate such imperatives, according to Jewish law, will be taken to 
account by the heavens—by God. This gap between the norm and its earthly 
enforcement is particularly true of “imperatives of the heart,” which deal with 
human feelings, including the imperative to love.202 For example, there are 
imperatives to love a convert, to refrain from hating, begrudging, or coveting, 
but it is not possible to compel a person to do so, just as it is not possible to 
compel a person to love his child, which is also an imperative of the heart. It is 
also not possible to compel a person to implement certain of the practical aspects 
of love, such as going to the funeral203 or showing hospitality.204 On the other 
hand, there are imperatives that are applicable to our issue which are practical, 
operative, and enforcable, such as compelling a person to divorce his wife in 
certain cases,205 compelling a person to give to charity,206 and compelling a 
person to send his child to a teacher to be educated.207 
Whatever the case, in Jewish law, the inability to enforce an obligation 
through human intervention does not lessen the legal nature of the norm, since 
there are plenty of legal norms without human enforcement. However, if we 
wish to examine the compatibility of the norms with contemporary modern 
secular law and see if a child can get compensated by his parents for emotional 
neglect, we shall have to examine whether the parent’s duties towards his child 
are enforcable. As noted, most of the imperatives of the heart are not enforcable, 
while most of the practical operative imperatives are subject to enforcement. 
Jewish sources discuss the absence of love towards other persons as a per se 
cause of injury. Institution of an action for damages because of the absence of 
love has not been completely negated, though the rationale for this conclusion is 
 
 199. Moshe Chiger, Duties of Parents towards their Children (from the Law of Tzdakkah), KOL 
HAKATUV LE’CHAIM 146-58 (Haim Rozenberg ed., 1983). 
 200. TALMUD BAVLI, Sanhedrin 19b, Tractate Sanhedrin Vol. 1, 19b3 (Hersh Goldwurm ed., 
Mesorah Publications, 2d ed. 2002). 
 201. TALMUD BAVLI, Bava Kama 55b; Gitin 53a. 
 202. For the imperatives of the heart, see RABBEINU BEHAYEI EVEN PEKUDA, THE LAW OF THE 
IMPERATIVES OF THE HEART (translated. Feldman, 1996); MAIMONIDES, CODE LAWS OF EXTORTION AND LOSS 
1:10, Eabn-Ezra Interpretation, on Exodus, 20:1. 
 203. Shulchan Arukh Yore De'ah 381:1-5. 
 204. Shulchan Arukh Orach Chayim 333:1. 
 205. Maimonides, Code, Laws of Gerushin (Divorce). 
 206. Shulchan Arukh Yore De'ah 247-59. 
 207. Shulchan Arukh Yore De'ah 245:4. 
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a convoluted one. The central precondition is that the act which is the subject of 
the claim is a negative act by the person violating the duty, and therefore the 
violation of the imperative does not remain inside his heart.208 It follows that 
only an act which expresses the absence of the parent’s love, and not merely an 
examination of what resides inside his heart, may lead to a recognizable claim 
by the child against the parent. 
In conclusion, it is possible that a child may sue his parent if the parent 
does not fulfill his emotional duties towards the child, but this will only be the 
case if it is possible to examine the manifestation of this absence of feeling 
through the parent’s observable deeds. However, even here, the actual existence 
of the duty in Jewish law will not give rise to earthly sanctions. The path 
towards achieving monetary damages for a child who has suffered emotional 
neglect by his parent is a complex one, and if there is a duty on a parent to love 
his child, and not only to avoid harming him emotionally, the enforcement of 
that duty in human courts has been very limited. Even then, the child is directed 
to vest the cause of action in another person, who will conduct the trial in the 
name of the child. 
B. The Compatibility of the Model to Modern Western Law 
Jewish law does not avoid confrontation with and intervention in matters 
belonging to the arena of love and other emotions, but its mode of intervention 
is unique. On one hand, the intervention is unusually sweeping, in that it does 
not only compel the parent not to harm or emotionally neglect the child, but also 
requires the parent to love him. Even the model of stringent-sweeping 
intervention does not place such strong demands upon the parent. On the other 
hand, the general unwillingness and inability of courts to enforce this duty in 
practice indicates a manifest discrepancy between this sweeping legal 
declaration and its almost impossible enforcement in human courts, as well as 
the ever-present limitations on claims by children against parents. This gap 
between declaration and enforcement is one which exists only in the eyes of a 
modern jurist. Enforcement by God is not foreign to Jewish law. 
The function of Jewish law as a religious system of law is generally to 
educate, not just to impose order in society by enforcing human sanctions. In the 
religious system of law, a man is under a duty first and foremost to his God, and 
accordingly, while the system is a legal system, the enforcement of some of its 
norms is carried out in the supra-human domain, the heavens. All of this is 
apart from the general problem of reconciling legal norms from a religious 
system to a modern secular one. 
Nonetheless, Jewish law can provide enormous help towards resolving the 
fundamental dilemma. We may learn from the balances drawn by Jewish law 
 
 208. Rabbi Kook in resp. in Hoshen Mishpat 26 concludes that the visible act of a person, stemming 
from lack of love for another (such as when a person takes an oath not to greet his friend), is a heizek 
she'eino nikar, meaning that the person causes an invisible damage that cannot be observed on the surface. 
The influence of the damaging action on the damaged object (body or money) cannot be seen by human 
eyes since the shape of the object remains the same. Emotional neglect may be deemed to be heizek she'eino 
nikar, but then one would have to pursue a very winding course before this kind of damage could be 
recognized as enforceable in a court of human law. For this issue, see Talmudic Encyclopedia, vol. 8, entries 
"heizek she'eino nikar" and "heizek she'eino nikar be'heizek she'lo huzkar batakanah," column 707. 
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between recognizing damages claims against a parent in principle, and 
protecting the honor of the parent and the unity of the family. This is 
particularly true when the child is dependent on the parent and the institution 
of the claim can lead to his expulsion from the home. 
The most appropriate model for gauging when to recognize a child’s claim 
against his parent, therefore, should draw upon principles presented in Jewish 
law. It acknowledges the great importance attached to the maintenance of 
proper family life, where on one hand the parent loves his child and fulfills all 
his needs, including his emotional needs, and on the other hand, it bears in 
mind the recognition of the limited power of human law to enforce these duties 
in practice. In addition, a certain gap between the unequivocal declaration and 
its minimal enforcement can in some cases also be applicable in secular law. 
Finally, it is possible to learn that in cases where it is possible to sue the parent it 
would be inappropriate to hastily give effect to this right. Instead, creative 
alternatives should be sought, including extra-legal alternatives, both in order to 
preserve the honor of the parent and safeguard the intimacy of the family unit, 
and in order to ensure the promotion of the best interests of the family members, 
including the injured child, prior to pursing the right to sue. 
VII. INTEGRATED MODEL PROPOSAL: SPECIAL POSITIVE ARRANGEMENTS 
INTEGRATING INTO PREVAILING LAW 
A. The Problems in Each of the Existing Models and the Need for an Integrated 
Model 
The different models presented in this paper reflect varying legal 
approaches towards the family unit. The model of moderate legal intervention 
which prevails today and the model of minimal intervention which has almost 
completely disappeared from the Western legal landscape both express the need 
to accord the family autonomy, privacy, and a special status as its own unit of 
society. That is the sole similarity between the models, as they differ 
substantively in terms of the degree of legal intervention they endorse. The 
model of minimal legal intervention sees the autonomy of the family unit as a 
quality which is both sanctified and fortified, resulting in almost total immunity 
against legal intervention into the behavior of the father or mother in his or her 
role as a parent. It expresses, in effect, an extreme position which leaves the 
intrafamilial relations open to excessive internal independent management and 
the exploitation of the weak by the strong. The model of moderate legal 
intervention also emphasizes the autonomy of the family, but also seeks to fulfill 
the needs of the individual – protecting the rights of the child and his best 
interests and even seeking to accord him equality, insofar as is possible within 
the traditional family structure. 
The two models which clash within modern systems of law are the model 
of moderate intervention and the model of stringent-sweeping intervention. The 
latter model starts from an almost completely opposite premise to the two 
models discussed above, as it argues that separate regulations for a family 
should not be established within prevailing tort law. According to this model, 
family disputes should be dealt with using customary legal tools, on the basis of 
the individualistic approach which underlies private law and which is not 
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interested in obstructing the right of the child to sue. It does not see the family as 
a unique unit in society, a consideration which the other models put forth, often 
for the benefit of the child himself (whether he realizes it or not). 
The model of moderate legal intervention draws a better balance between 
considerations of sanctity of the family and individualism, and between the 
fundamental desire to grant the child equality and the necessary recognition that 
it is not possible in practice to maintain equality between two such different 
members of this delicate and unique unit. However, the model is overly 
paternalistic and lacks a clear normative statement regarding what constitutes 
inappropriate behavior by the parent in cases of emotional neglect and 
boundaries of parental behavior to determine which claims should be 
recognized in court. Accordingly, this model does not provide a successful 
bridge between the model of minimal intervention and the model of stringent-
sweeping intervention, and its implementation is problematic. 
In contrast, the model of soft-sweeping intervention assembles most of the 
missing pieces of the jigsaw puzzle and presents a more balanced theoretical 
approach, one which creates a gap between a sweeping positive declaration and 
moderate enforcement. This gap is expressed on the one hand by a clear and 
sweeping positive declaration regarding the need for a parent to love his child, 
and on the other hand by the possibility, in principle, though it is difficult to 
implement in practice, of recognizing a civil claim by a child against his parent. 
While this model cannot stand as it is in a modern system of law, because it 
relies on religious legal traditions and places importance on norms, some of 
which are not enforceable by human beings, borrowing some of its principles 
will help to resolve the fundamental dilemma. 
Creating a model which takes an intermediate path between the judicial 
models, and between the individualistic approach and the family approach, 
requires caution. The ideal model must look at the members of the family unit as 
individuals who have rights and may sue each other, even their parents, who do 
not enjoy absolute immunity. At the same time, it needs to preserve, to some 
extent, the perception that the family should be treated as a special unit, and 
that parent-child relations are different from relations between strangers. 
Bush and Folger present a relational world view that balances the 
individualistic and family approaches in the context of mediation.209 In their 
view, the individualistic approach is inappropriate because it focuses solely on 
the individual and his discrete identity. This approach is too extreme, as it sees 
attachment felt by an individual to be a sign of weakness.210 The collectivist 
approach, akin to the family approach in the present context, negates the rights 
of the individual by exaggerating the importance of the collective. Thus, it is also 
inappropriate when it stands on its own.211 In Bush and Folger’s opinion, a 
relational world view must be taken, one which does not negate the 
individualistic approach, but sees it as merely one dimension of a more complex 
fabric, wherein there is an understanding that humans are concerned not only 
 
 209. ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION: RESPONDING TO 
CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION 245 (1994). 
 210. Id. at 238-39, 245. 
 211. Id. at 241, 245. 
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with themselves, but with the broader society to which they belong.212 This 
approach recognizes that a human being is concurrently both separate and 
connected.213 The relational world view attempts, therefore, to maintain the 
dichotomy between the individual and the collective, with all its ambivalence. It 
seems that this intermediate approach, raised by Bush and Folger with regards 
to mediation, is particularly appropriate to civil disputes within the family unit. 
It provides room for tort litigation against a parent, but also for balance and 
restrictions. 
To find the ideal model, we must identify the points of connection between 
the family and the individualistic approaches, each of which is lacking and 
unbalanced on its own. In Kagitcibasi’s opinion, it is necessary to present a 
complex family structure, which expresses a nexus between the individual and 
the collective, that is to say, between culture, the structure of the family, the 
values of society, and the mutual relations within the family.214 A similar path is 
taken from the feminist perspective by Martha Minow and Mary Lyndon 
Shanley, who offer an account of family relations that reconciles this tension by 
seeing the members of the family as individuals while simultaneously 
recognizing their connections to each other.215 
In light of the problems the existing models entail, creative thinking is 
required to formulate a new balanced model, in the spirit of the general 
proposals of Bush and Folger, Kagitcibasi, and Minow and Shanley, under 
which there will be place for a civil claim against a family member, but there 
will also be protection of the family as a unit. The starting point of the proposed 
model will be the individualistic approach, which recognizes the right of the 
child to sue for damages. But my intermediate solution will be built by 
restricting blanket recognition of such claims, and by treating them unlike other 
tort claims. This model will be inspired by the soft-sweeping model of legal 
intervention, subject to necessary changes and adjustments, and will adopt 
principles from both clashing modern models – the moderate legal intervention 
and the stringent-sweeping legal intervention models – while discarding their 
shortcomings. 
B. The Integrated Model: A Proposal for Resolving the Fundamental Dilemma 
This section offers an integrated proposal for resolving the fundamental 
dilemma, which may be compatible with every modern general system of law. 
This model attempts to draw a balance between the clashing considerations. It 
emphasizes the importance of maintaining harmony and restoring peace to the 
family unit, in cases where this is feasible, alongside implementation of the right 
to sue in cases where it is no longer possible to rescue the family relationships. 
The emotional neglect issue is used here as a test case, but the criteria the model 
introduces are designed to apply to every type of tort lawsuit against a parent, 
whatever the grounds. These are the basic elements of the proposal: (1) creation 
 
 212. Id. at 242-43. 
 213. Id. at 241. 
 214. CIGDEM KAGITCIBASI, FAMILY AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT ACROSS CULTURES: A VIEW FROM 
THE OTHER SIDE, 1-19 (1996). 
 215. Minow & Shanley, supra note 6, at 5-6. 
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of a reasonable gap between sweeping declaration of children’s rights to be free 
from emotional neglect and moderate enforcement that is compatible with 
modern law, but not religious law; (2) presentation of criteria for recognition of 
the tort law suit, which was missing in the Amin case and may be partially 
drawn from American law; (3) referral of the parties to a mandatory extra-
judicial procedure if the court feels that there is a chance to renew family 
harmony—an alternative that, when feasible, may neutralize the disadvantages 
of recognizing a tort law claim; and (4) allowance for special “emotional” 
remedies, among them apology and expression of remorse. 
1. Creation of a Reasonable Gap between Sweeping Declaration and 
Moderate Enforcement 
Unlike in Jewish law, in modern secular law it is difficult to enforce a 
positive duty of an individual to love another person, even if the individuals 
involved are parent and child. Nevertheless, we must examine the possibility of 
legislating a clause in Family Acts or Child Acts which requires a parent to 
respect his child and satisfy his emotional, mental, and spiritual needs, in 
addition to his material needs. 
The significance of granting rights to individual family members against 
each other as a means of respect has great importance. Joel Feinberg explains 
that rights play a significant role in the construction of genuine loving relations, 
because rights establish respect.216 According to him, having rights is necessary 
for human dignity and self-respect.217 Relying on this idea, he has claimed that 
rights are “as necessary to love as affection itself.”218 He mentions that one way 
to define love is “a relation between persons characterized by mutual affection 
and moral respect, among other things.”219 Feinberg thus suggests that since 
respect is closely tied to the idea of rights, rights are valuable for being the object 
of moral respect, and they are essentially constituent “of the full bond of 
love.”220 
I suggest that recognizing that children have the right to the warm care of 
their parents, or at least the right to have their needs, both physical and 
emotional, met by their parents, would create a societal and familial respect for 
the child, even if this right is not enforced on a daily basis. 
A possible proposal for establishing such a right in the civil domain would 
be that: 
Parents, as guardians to a minor child, are under a duty to act in the best 
interests of the child in the way that devoted parents would act in the same 
circumstances, showing respect for the child and consideration for his material 
and emotional needs. 
 
 216. Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 479-80 (1968) (suggesting that the right to privacy be 
based on respect). 
 217. Id. 
 218. Joel Feinberg, Moral Rights and the Constitution, in THE NORMATIVE CONSTITUTION: ESSAYS 
FOR THE THIRD CENTURY 99, 118 (1995). 
 219. Joel Feinberg, In Defense of Moral Rights: Their Social Importance, in FREEDOM AND 
FULFILLMENT: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS at 239, n.17. 
 220. Id. 
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Even if this norm will not always be enforced, the civil legal declaration per 
se is important because it establishes a valuable legal and moral norm. This 
declaration can be used by the court for the purpose of establishing a standard 
of parental conduct and duty of care in relation to negligence. 
Another possibility is to establish a more moderate section in civil law 
which views the issue from the perspective of the right of the child, and not 
from the perspective of the duty of the parent: 
It is the right of a child to grow safely, with care taken for his welfare, and have 
his parents or other guardian take part in the process of raising him. It is also his 
right to receive his basic living, material, and emotional needs from said parents 
or guardians. 
The expressive function of law has a great deal of importance. The law is 
not only a mechanism of dispute-solving; it can also convey various ideas, 
ideals, and social themes.221 It may direct and affect human modes of expression, 
behavior, and inter-relationships.222 This is particularly true in the realm of 
family life and intimate relations, where ideology, emotions, and other powerful 
extra-legal forces affect human behavior.223 Due to the expressive function of the 
law, recognizing children’s rights vis-à-vis their parents is a valuable step in 
itself. Such a right conveys an important message regarding the independent 
personality of children, and the respect they should be given as persons by their 
parents—a conclusion that is not always obvious, especially in the legal aspect. 
There is sometimes a gap between a sweeping declaration and moderate 
enforcement in modern secular systems of law. This gap, which means that the 
law declares a norm but does not necessarily enforce it, is especially visible in 
the following examples: the civil duty of a child to obey his parents in relation to 
every matter belonging to their guardianship over him, according to § 26 of 
UNCRC and § 16 of the Israeli LCGL and as derived from the Restatement;224 
 
 221. See, e.g., Carol Weisbrod, On the Expressive Functions of Family Law, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 991, 
995.(1989). 
 222. See, e.g., Lewis A. Kornhauser, No Best Answer?, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1599, 1625 (1998); ROBERT 
C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 284-85 (1991). 
 223. See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND 
OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 14-34 (1995); see also Weisbrod, supra note 221, at 995-96. 
 224. § 16 of the Israeli LCGL requires a child to obey his parents in relation to every matter 
belonging to their guardianship over him, while showing respect for his mother and father. Israeli law 
does not enforce this section in practice. § 29(1)(c) of UNCRC provides for a similar arrangement 
(“States Parties agree that the education of the child shall be directed to… [t]he development of respect 
for the child’s parents.”). UNCRC, supra note 15. Indeed, it is difficult to describe a situation in which 
this Article will be enforced in the daily relations within the family, that is to say, where a refusal by a 
child to obey his parents will expose the child to a civil claim by his parents. It follows that the law itself 
recognizes the possibility of the existence of statutory provisions which have a declarative objective; 
their importance lies in their social and value-laden dimensions, and they are not enforced by choice. 
The standard set out in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 895G(2) (1977), discussed above, also 
refers to the absence of immunity of the child himself in actions brought against him by the parent (and 
not just the converse), and here too we have not found an instance of a claim brought by a parent 
against his child despite the absence of immunity. In Jewish law too, there is a similar “mirror image”: 
not only is the imperative “and you shall love your neighbor as yourself,” from which the duty of the 
parent to love his child is derived, not enforced in many cases, but many aspects of the commandment 
to respect one’s mother and father also remain unenforced in human law. See TALMUD BAVLI, Shabbat 
127a, Tractate Shabbos Vol. 4, 127aa (Yisroel Simcha Schorr ed., Mesorah Publications, 3d ed. 2002); 
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and Scandinavian civil legislation in relation to corporal punishment of children 
by their parents.225 
The proposed gap is not at the level of a sweeping declaration versus 
marginal non-enforcement, but versus moderate enforcement. 
An approach of moderate enforcement should express a clear list of criteria 
for recognition of the claim. 
2. Presentation of Criteria for Recognition of the Tort Law Suit 
A dispute between parent and child which reaches civil court should be 
treated in more a delicate manner than a case between strangers. As noted, the 
prevailing models have not established sufficient criteria for determining when 
courts should recognize the child’s claim. Therefore, I shall now propose a list of 
rules and criteria, the more of which are met in a given situation, the easier it 
will be for the court to hold that the child is entitled to compensation for 
emotional neglect. These standards are constructed primarily in an attempt to 
balance the considerations for and against recognition of the claim, the many 
considerations in American law resulting in various approaches to parental 
immunity (taken from the moderate legal intervention model), an analysis of the 
Amin ruling, and the approach taken by Jewish law to claims of this sort. As 
mentioned, the emotional neglect issue is our test example, but the criteria to be 
introduced are designed to apply to every tort lawsuit against a parent. 
Accordingly, recognition of the claim will depend upon the existence of the 
following criteria: 
a) The parental conduct does not stem from authority and care giving. 
According to the limitations on the doctrine of parental immunity in American 
law, there is a greater likelihood of recognition of a claim which does not stem 
from the exercise of parental authority, but rather from a business transaction in 
 
Talmud Bavli, Chulin 110b, Tractate Chullin Vol. 4, 110b (Yisroel Simcha Schorr & Chaim Malinowitz 
eds., Mesorah Publications 2005); id. at 142a1-2. 
 225. All the Scandinavian countries have adopted in their civil law a type of prohibition on 
corporal punishment which is formulated as the right of the child not to be exposed to corporal 
punishment. See SUSAN H. BITENSKY, CORPORAL PUNISHMENT OF CHILDREN: A HUMAN RIGHTS 
VIOLATION 154-70, 180-84 (2006); Shmueli, Corporal Punishment, supra note 6, at 110-15. This is a first 
step in a process which is designed to educate the public and change the prevalent view on this 
issue. Sweden, which was a pioneer in this area, accompanied this statutory provision with a 
widespread publicity campaign conducted by the Ministry of Justice using advertisements and 
dissemination of explanatory materials, with the clear goal that parents would abandon the path of 
corporal punishment. The battle against the phenomenon did not take place through the courts, 
except in extreme and severe cases. The Scandinavian countries showed patience: surveys which 
were conducted an average of 15 years after the beginning of this process in each of the 
Scandinavian countries pointed to a drastic drop in the phenomena. The educational campaign was 
launched with patience and an expectation that results would take years to show themselves. See id. I 
do not intend to say that conclusions must be drawn directly or in an identical manner from these 
two cases. Moderate, reasonable, and light corporal punishment which is imposed by a parent on his 
child, even if it is undesirable, is still made within the family framework and out of the parent’s 
desire to educate his child, whereas negligence, disregard, alienation, and abandonment are an 
expression of indifference and lack of care and attention; we have here a legal arrangement which 
creates a gap between a sweeping declaration and moderate enforcement, where the data points to 
the fact that this gap led, ultimately, to the desired results. See id. at 119-23. 
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which the parent and child are involved (for example, when there is an 
employment contract between them).226 
b) The claim is in fact directed at a third party. Here, too, following the 
limitations on the doctrine in American law, when the claim is directed at a third 
party, such as an employer or insurer, there will be a tendency to recognize the 
claim even if to reach this result liability must be imposed on the parent.227 In 
such a case, direct confrontation between the parent and child, which is 
something traditional approaches to our issue have sought to avoid, does not 
take place, and the employer or insurer rather than the parent pays the damage. 
c) The parent acts deliberately and intentionally, or at least 
recklessly, with a lack of good faith and without consideration for the best 
interests of the child. This criterion is in the spirit of one of the limitations on the 
doctrine of parental immunity found in American law228 and in § 22 of the Israeli 
LCGL.229 When the parent is able, without investing great effort, to maintain 
minor emotional contact with his child and he deliberately does not do so, there 
will be a tendency to recognize the claim. On the other hand, in the case of 
parents who have a sick child and who invest most of their time and effort in 
him, and consequently neglect that child’s siblings, such a claim will not be 
recognized. There will be a similar result in the case of a parent who is almost 
never at home as a result of commitment to work (e.g. a person belonging to the 
security forces or a parent who works abroad and only comes home 
infrequently), as this is perceived as one of the maladies of society rather than a 
fault of the parent’s. The child can also be the victim of excessive affluence or 
poverty, if the parent either spends too much time seeking self-fulfillment and 
career development, or is unable to give sufficient attention to his child because 
he is trying to earn a basic living. Thus, in all emotional neglect cases it is 
essential to consider the facts at hand, and to raise questions such as: was the 
neglect really performed with the intention of furthering the best interests of the 
child? 
d) The type of tort committed by the parent. There is a substantive 
difference between claims relying on the rule of negligence, which are the torts 
which cause emotional injury, and claims which rely on torts such as assault, 
battery, or false imprisonment, which are generally seen as arising from 
attempts by the parent to educate the child. Whereas in torts of the first type, 
 
 226. See, supra Part IV. 
 227. See, supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
 228. See Trevarton v. Trevarton, 378 P.2d 640, 641-42 (criticizing judgments that imposed 
immunity without differentiating between intentional acts and negligent ones); Foldi v. Jeffries, 461 
A.2d 1145, 1152 (N.J. 1983) (holding that the freedom of educating the child cannot justify the use of 
violence or any intentional act of harm towards a child); Doe v. Holt, 418 S.E.2d 511, 514-15 (N.C. 1992) 
(stating that outrageous conduct of the parent indeed justifies holding him liable for full damages); Frye v. 
Frye, 505 A.2d 826 (1986) (explaining that outrageous conduct is cruel and inhuman, or wanton and 
malicious); Henderson v. Woolley, 644 A.2d 1303, 1307-09 (Conn. 1994) (stating that the immunity 
should be abolished only as to certain classes of torts such as intentional torts and sexual abuse). 
 229. See, supra Part VI B. 
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judicial policy determines when to recognize the claim, 230 this is not the case in 
torts of the second type. In those torts, a claim must be allowed if the elements of 
the specific tort have been proven, without taking into account various matters 
of judicial policy or the motive behind the parental conduct. Nonetheless, there 
is room to consider issues of judicial policy even in claims that arise from the 
latter type of tort. In such claims, one must examine whether it is right to 
intervene in the family unit and the extent of intervention that is desirable. It 
seems that the way to do this is to examine the degree of desirability of the 
conduct performed. In other words, corporal punishment or imprisonment such 
as a “time out” or grounding are connected to the education of the child, which 
is a positive act in principle, and whether society should intervene in such 
conduct relies upon the degree to which such conduct is performed—i.e. the 
question of limits. In contrast, emotional neglect, like any neglect, has no 
educational or other positive rationale, and accordingly it can be equated for this 
paper’s purposes to those acts which are not connected to parental capacity, 
such as driving or employment relations, or acts which have no underlying 
positive aspect, such as sexual abuse. Accordingly, it may be that the grounds 
for recognizing a claim for emotional neglect are stronger than the grounds for 
recognizing claims based on corporal punishment or imprisonment. This 
modification from what is customarily accepted ensues from the unique nature 
of intrafamilial torts, and from the understanding that a routine recognition of 
tort claims in cases of actions which are fundamentally desirable, even if one 
might say that the parent has not acted reasonably when performing them, may 
lead to over-deterrence. On the contrary, if the action is not desirable and stems 
from parental indifference instead of parental care, no such over-deterrence 
occurs. 
The following two guidelines attempt to give meaning to the vague 
statements found in the Amin ruling: 
a) The parental conduct is cruel or persistent. In accordance with the 
Restatement standard, cruelty is sometimes expressed by the fact that emotional 
neglect is accompanied by material neglect, as in the Amin and Burnette cases, or 
by serious violence, which intensifies the gravity of the misconduct and the 
developmental damage to the child. However, it is also possible to describe 
cases of severe emotional neglect per se, which will meet this guideline even 
without physical violence. 
b) The damage proven is severe. This is consistent with the current 
approach taken by many of the U.S. jurisdictions which recognize IIED only in 
cases of “severe emotional distress,” as well as the general limitation expressed 
in Section 1(d) of the Family Court Law in Israel,231 under which the claim of a 
minor is only allowed in cases of severe injury.232 For this purpose, it is 
 
 230. Using questions such as: in which cases will the negligence be recognized? Is it only when the 
standard of reasonableness has not been met or is it confined to cases of severe negligence?. Cf. Neeley, 
supra note 1, at 715-16. 
 231. Supra note 132. 
 232. A similar criterion was presented in the past in other cases, even in cases of emotional damage, 
although not in regard to intrafamilial relations. In the United States, see Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 
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necessary to examine in every case the nature of the emotional damage and 
obtain the assistance of experts to determine its severity. The literature takes the 
damage which emotional neglect may cause very seriously. The literature 
contains considerable evidence that neglect, including emotional neglect, may 
cause the child psychological harm on a variety of levels and over different 
periods of time,233 and these may be expressed in different physical 
syndromes.234 There are those who see emotional neglect which has taken place 
over a long period of time as a cumulative trauma, in that it undermines the 
development of the child on different levels235 and may cause him various types 
of harm. The literature lists among the characteristic types of damage ensuing 
from emotional neglect: physical, mental and other developmental syndromes, 
which are primarily connected to developmental psychopathology. 
Psychopathology is a field that deals with pathological development and mental 
illness or psychological impairment.236 According to it, injuries take place over 
the short, intermediate, and long term, and include: the development of various 
diseases; possible damage to the quality of attachment felt by the child towards 
other children or adults, including lack of confidence and fundamental distrust 
towards other human beings; tardy development; problems in bonding between 
the child and his parents (both the wrongdoer and the one who did not do any 
wrong); the collapse of a marriage, since the matured child cannot build 
relationships; fears and suspicions, such as fear of abandonment; inferiority 
complex; depression; tendency to addiction; problems of adaptation to various 
frameworks and problems in learning and concentration; problems of self-
image, low self-esteem, loss of identity; various post-traumatic syndromes; 
aggressiveness, anger towards others, and violence; and, in extreme cases, loss 
of desire to live, suicide attempts, and diminished ability to make contact and 
feel emotion. Emotional neglect may even create a cycle which will affect the 
next generation, in one of two ways. A parent who was emotionally neglected in 
 
829 (Cal. 1989); Greenberg v. Stanley, 143 A.2d 588, 597-98 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1958), aff'd in part, 
rev'd in part, 153 A.2d 833 (N.J. 1959); Courtney v. Courtney, 413 S.E.2d 418, 422 (W. Va. 1991); Harless 
v. First National Bank, 289 S.E.2d 692, 701-02 (W. Va. 1982); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436(3) 
(1965); DOBBS, supra note 23, at 841; W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 
365 (5th ed. 1984). In the United Kingdom, see White v. Chief Constable, (1999) 2 A.C. 455 (H.L.) (appeal 
taken from C.A.); Alcock v. Chief Constable, (1992) 1 A.C. 310 (H.L.) (appeal taken from C.A.); 
McLoughlin v. O’Brian, (1983) 1 A.C. 410 (H.L.) (appeal taken from C.A.); Owens v. Liverpool Corp., 
(1939) 1 K.B. 349, 400; McLoughlin v. O’Brian (1982) 2 All Eng. Rep. 298 (H. L.) (opinion of Lord 
Wilberforce); Alcock v. Chief Constable (1991) 3 W.L.R. 1057; White v. Chief Constable (1999) 1 All E.R. 1; 
Susan Maidment Kershner, Children v. Parents: A New Tort Duty-Situation for Psychiatric Injury?, 35 ISR. L. 
REV. 79, 79 (2001). In Israel, see Permission for CA 444/87 ElSucha v. The Estate of Dahan, (1990) (IsrSC) 
43(3) 397; CA 754, 759/05 Levi v. Sha’arei Tzedek Medical Center (not yet published, June 5, 2007). 
 233. Dennis Drotar, Prevention of Neglect and Nonorganic Failure to Thrive, in PREVENTION OF CHILD 
MALTREATMENT: DEVELOPMENTAL AND ECOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 115, 119 (Diane J. Willis, E. Wayne 
Holden & Mindy Susan Rosenberg eds., 1992). 
 234. Maria Berger & Hansi Kennedy, in collaboration with Don Campbell, Sara Lundberg & Randi 
Markowitz, Pseudobackwardness in Children: Maternal Attitudes as an Etiological Factor, 30 
PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY OF THE CHILD 279 (1975). 
 235. See M. Masud R. Khan, The Concept of Cumulative Trauma, 18 THE PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY OF 
THE CHILD 286 (1963). 
 236. http://medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/psychopathology, last visited on February 
22, 2010. 
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his childhood and did not feel love from his parents, may, on one hand, aspire to 
“compensate” himself for his past difficulties by placing excessive pressure on 
his own children, and, on the other hand, may fail to love his own children, 
possibly resulting in neglect or abuse.237 
Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit “tie the ends” between emotional neglect and 
the intergenerational circle: 
Only a child who has at least one person whom he can love, and who also feels 
loved, valued, and wanted by that person, will develop a healthy self-esteem. 
He can then become confident of his own chances of achievement in life and 
convinced of his own human value. Where this positive environmental attitude 
toward an infant is missing from the start, the consequences become obvious in 
later childhood and adult life. They take the form of the individual’s diminished 
care for the well-being of his own body, or for his physical appearance and 
clothing, or for his image presented to his fellow beings. What is damaged is his 
love and regard for himself, and consequently his capacity to love and care for 
others, including his own children. . . . Adults who as children suffered from 
disruptions of continuity may themselves, in “identifying” with their many 
“parents,” treat their children as they themselves were treated—continuing a 
cycle costly for both a new generation of children as well as for society itself.238 
There are those who argue that the long-term damage caused by emotional 
neglect exceeds the damage caused by various types of abuse, including 
physical abuse239 and sexual abuse.240 It follows that in many cases proving 
emotional neglect will satisfy the criteria of proving very serious damage. 
Indeed, a considerable portion of the harm caused by emotional neglect 
develops at a later stage in the life of the child; however, it is possible to assess 
the expected harm to the plaintiff child by means of expert evidence and reliance 
on the professional literature in the area. 
a) Family circumstances. The court must conduct an examination of the 
circumstances of the case and the extent to which they have caused emotional 
harm to the child. The social-science literature points to a significant negative 
 
 237. Vicki Carlson, Dante Cicchetti, Douglas Barnett & Karen Braunwald, Disorganized/Disoriented 
Attachment Relationships in Maltreated Infants, 25 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 525 (1989); Joan 
Kaufman & Dante Cicchetti, Effects of Maltreatment on School-Age Children's Socioemotional Development: 
Assessments in a Day Camp Setting, 25 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 516 (1989); JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, 
ANNA FREUD, & ALBERT J. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 20, 33 (1973); J. Lawrence 
Aber et al, The Effects of Maltreatment on Development During Early Childhood: Recent Studies and Their 
Theoretical, Clinical and Policy Implications, in DANTE CICCHETTI & VICKI CARLSON (EDS.), CHILD 
MALTREATMENT: THEORY AND RESEARCH ON THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF CHILD ABUSE AND 
NEGLECT 579-619 (1989); Dante Cicchetti & Marjorie Beeghly, Symbiotic Development in Maltreated 
Youngsters: An Organizational Perspective, 36 NEW DIRECTIONS FOR CHILD DEVELOPMENT 47 (1987); 
Robert H. Mnookin, Foster Care – In Whose Best Interests?, 43 HARV. EDUCATIONAL REV. 599, 623-25 
(1973); Lenore C. Terr, A Family Study of Child Abuse, 127 AMER. J. PSYCHIAT. 125 (1970); Neeley, supra 
note 1, at 690, 693, 696-97. 
 238. GOLDSTEIN, FREUD, & SOLNIT, supra note 237, at 20. 
 239. Sonia Renee Martin, A Child's Right to be Gay: Addressing the Emotional Maltreatment of Queer 
Youth, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 167, 171 (1996); Judith G. McMullen, The Inherent Limitations of After-the-Fact 
Statutes Dealing with the Emotional and Sexual Maltreatment of Children, 41 DRAKE L. REV. 483, 494-95 
(1992). 
 240. Neeley, supra note 1, at 691-97. 
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influence which may result from neglect in families, irrespective of their 
economic or social strata.241 Nonetheless, one may assume that courts will take a 
more lenient approach towards parents in a family suffering from severe 
financial problems, or parents whose adopted child has not adapted well to his 
adoptive family. Conversely, courts should extend no such leniency to 
emotional neglect by parents in families which seem to the outside observer to 
be normal. On the other hand, one might argue that in families where there are 
circumstantial difficulties, emotional neglect actually causes greater harm to the 
child, and this justifies a harsher position towards the parent rather than a more 
lenient one. Thus, for example, a parent who neglects a child in circumstances 
where the child has no other parent (because that parent has left, or died—as in 
the Amin case—or the family is a one-parent family from the start) violates his 
duty as a parent in an even more severe and cruel manner, because he is the 
only one on whom the child can rely. Likewise, adoptive parents who 
emotionally neglect their adopted children may cause them more serious harm 
than biological parents, because the adopted children feel that they have been 
betrayed twice, once by each set of parents. 
b) Preservation of the integrity of the family unit and an examination 
of the likelihood of healing the rifts and restoring harmony to the family as 
much as possible. So long as it is possible to do this, in accordance with the basic 
principles of American law, the law must do its part to rehabilitate the family 
unit and refer the parties for treatment within an extra-judicial framework prior 
to recognizing the civil claim. When the family unit has already been destroyed, 
and there is no possibility of rehabilitating it and restoring its harmony, or if this 
prospect is irrelevant because the child is no longer part of the family unit 
because he has reached the age of majority and has left the home or his 
connection with his parents has been severed, or when the extra-judicial effort 
has failed, there is room for considering recognition of the claim, in accordance 
with the other criteria presented above. 
The proposed criteria can also be relevant in other cases of civil claims 
brought by children against their parents, not only in cases of emotional neglect. 
However, only setting criteria is not sufficient – our model must take further 
steps to completely address all of the issues at hand. Legislatures should offer 
the courts the possibility of sending the parties to seek a non-judicial ADR 
solution, as a mandatory stage prior to hearing the case when the court feels that 
there is a possibility of restoring harmony to the family. 
3. Referral of the Parties to a Mandatory Extra-Judicial Procedure in Cases 
Presenting a Chance to Renew Family Harmony 
It is not appropriate to resolve all family disputes within a judicial setting. 
An application to the court can be a symptom of a serious family problem which 
must be dealt with, but provision of legal relief does not always satisfy the true 
needs of the plaintiff child. Sometimes it is the default option, particularly when 
it allows the child to confront his parent directly in a setting which is not easy 
 
 241. See, e.g., Karp & Karp, supra note 14, at 392-94; Kearney, supra note 111, at 453-54; Neeley, 
supra note 1, at 713. 
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for either party. The minimal legal intervention model thought that it was right 
to bar the claim. The court can provide an appropriate arena for settling disputes 
even where they relate to the family. However, the parties can be referred by the 
court to an alternative process which can help the entire family. The utility of an 
extra-judicial process in the initial stages of the claim will lie in its ability to 
expose the real reason for the institution of the civil claim, and bring about a 
more successful solution than the award of damages. This extra-judicial process 
is inspired by the consideration of familial harmony, which was originally taken 
from American law, and integrated with inspiration taken from Jewish law, 
which sought alternative paths. 
The true interest of the child plaintiff does not always coincide with his 
legal right, as not every interest can be met in the legal arena. The interest which 
motivates the child’s claim may not really be the desire to obtain monetary 
compensation, but rather, for example, the desire to obtain an expression of 
remorse or apology from the parent, or a desire to obtain a victory over the 
parent, which can play an important part in healing the child.242 On occasion, 
the child seeks, sometimes unbeknownst to him, to reconcile with his parent and 
return to a normal family routine, or at least to establish some form of 
communication.243 The limitations of the law do not allow a court to expend the 
time and effort to uncover the real desires of the plaintiff in order to determine 
the real remedy he would like. This means that the plaintiff is forced to request 
the usual remedies provided in tort law, particularly monetary compensation, 
even when the adversarial litigation process may ultimately harm the family 
and deepen the rift between its members.244 In other cases, potential plaintiffs 
may indeed waive their right to tort litigation, since this does not really reflect 
their wishes. 
There are situations in which a tort claim is filed and it comes before the 
court, which chooses to consider it, but the court understands that the real 
remedy being sought is something other than compensation. Here the 
mechanism of tort litigation is not really suitable for resolving the dispute. There 
are two possible solutions. The first is an increased effort by the judges to solve 
the dispute between the child and the parent by means of a compromise. 
However, often this is not possible—judges cannot “work miracles”—and this 
solution is thus limited, although in many instances it is utilized. 
Another possible solution may be to resolve the dispute through non-
judicial means; that is, to send the parties for mediation, counseling, or therapy. 
Mediation is a process in which the two parties, with the assistance of a neutral 
person, systematically isolate issues within their dispute, so as to create options 
and consider alternatives that could lead to an agreement that serves the needs 
 
 242. Cf. THE HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 16, at 59. 
 243. Schuz, supra note 34, at 175 (arguing that compensation might not be so important and 
meaningful compared to the damage to the family as a whole). But cf. Caroline Forell, Statutory Torts, 
Statutory Duty Actions, and Negligence Per Se: What's the Difference?, 77 OR. L. REV. 497, 528, note 146 
(1998) (“[w]hat would be accomplished by children suing their indigent parents? It seems likely that 
the only purpose that would be served would be to further punish the parents for abandoning their 
children. Since this is [a criminal offense] it’s hard to see what additional punitive benefit is served 
through a lawsuit.”). 
 244. See Lyons v. Lyons, 208 N.E.2d 533, 535 (Ohio 1965). 
Shmueli_cpcxns.doc 5/5/2010  1:54:21 PM 
 LOVE AND THE LAW, CHILDREN AGAINST MOTHERS AND FATHERS 183 
of the parties.245 This is a subjective, reconciliatory process, as opposed to legal 
proceedings which are an objective process, based on rivalry and abstract 
laws.246 The stages of mediation, which is meant to be a fair, speedy, and just 
process, are: (a) the parties present their demands, and the mediator assists them 
in reaching agreement; (b) the parties submit the agreement to their attorneys, 
and they formulate it in legal terms for submission to the court; and (c) the court 
gives the mediation agreement the force of a legal judgment.247 
Indeed, there are those who point to extra-judicial options like mediation as 
more successful than litigation in many cases,248 particularly in situations of child 
abuse.249 Mediation proceedings help to preserve intrafamilial relationships 
without intensifying the rivalry between the parties.250 Unlike the adversarial 
approach of litigation, which focuses on attributing blame for past events, 
mediation focuses on the future, and serves as a source of empowerment for both 
parties, encouraging them to express their individual needs in order to reach 
mutual agreement.251 This option may bring to the surface the true desires of the 
parties, while not limiting them to the remedies provided by legal proceedings. 
The informal atmosphere prevailing in mediations or treatment sessions and the 
use of non-legal language and the absence of legal procedures, in contrast to the 
authoritarian and even threatening atmosphere of the court environment, can help 
achieve true communication, whereas the legal process may actually intensify the 
problem. 
The central problems facing this solution are high costs and the difficulty of 
“dragging” the victim to these ADR extra-judicial processes, which by their 
nature rely on the willingness of both parties to participate, have a desire to 
resolve the problems, and intend to reach a settlement. On the other hand, these 
processes are swift and often less expensive than legal proceedings. 
The goal of corrective justice can also be achieved by use of extra-judicial 
devices. Some scholars perceive peace-making between the parties, or 
appeasement, as an independent goal of civil law.252 Indeed, the mechanism of 
mediation in civil cases is not foreign to the law.253 For our purposes, courts 
must examine whether there is a chance of restoring family harmony. 
 
 245. See, e.g., Holly Joyce, Mediation and Domestic Violence: Legislative Responses, 14 J. AM. ACAD. 
MATRIMONIAL LAW 447, 447 (1997). 
 246. Id. 
 247. Sarah Krieger, The Dangers of Mediation in Domestic Violence Cases, 8 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 
235, 243 (2002). 
 248. Roselle L. Wissler, Court-Connected Mediation in General Civil Cases: What We Know from 
Empirical Research, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 641, 670-77 (2002) (taking less time and being more 
likely to settle the disputes between the parties). 
 249. See, e.g., Jolene M. Lowry, Family Group Conferences as a Form of Court-Approved Alternative 
Dispute Resolution in Child Abuse and Neglect Cases, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 57, 61-63 (1997). 
 250. Krieger, supra note 247, at 241. 
 251. Kerry Loomis, Domestic Violence and Mediation: A Tragic Combination for Victims in California 
Family Court, 35 CAL. W.L. REV. 355, 367 (1999). 
 252. Williams, supra note 23, at 138-40. 
 253. In the area of tort law (as in insurance law, building defects, copyright, taxation, and 
banking), it is customary in North America to turn to Early Neutral Evaluation – ENE – in which the 
court appoints an expert attorney to give an opinion to the parties regarding the chances of success 
of the claim and the amount of the financial relief which may be awarded, if any. The opinion does 
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Mediation may also help the abuser to explain his acts or omissions. Thus, 
for example, a parent can explain that he abused his child or neglected him 
because he himself suffered a difficult childhood, has financial troubles, suffers 
from a serious physical, mental, or medical problem, is a single-parent, or 
because the plaintiff child is hyperactive and difficult to raise, etc. Of course, the 
aim here is not to accept an excuse for abusive or neglectful behavior which 
blames the child, but to reach some understanding in order to try and renew the 
relationship and rebuild the broken family. There is value to allowing the 
wrongdoer to express himself freely, to having the mediator and the victim 
listen, and to have the parent hear the complaints of the child victim. 
Sometimes, this will be the first time that the abuser comprehends the extent of 
the harm that he has caused the child. It is also very important for the victim to 
talk about the harm his parent has caused to him. Many victims are interested in 
expressing their frustrations before the abuser, and they seek recognition from 
the abuser and from society of the fact that they have been caused harm and that 
they themselves are not at fault. From the point of view of the victims, an 
apology and expression of remorse on the part of the abuser can be preferable 
sometimes to monetary compensation, though the compensation can play an 
important part in the process. The mediation can also induce the abusive parent 
to take responsibility for his actions. It is difficult to achieve all this in the civil 
legal process. 
Successful mediation also causes the parties to reach an agreement regarding 
the final solution to the dispute, even if this means that they abandon their initial 
positions to some extent. In contrast, the outcome in a legal proceeding is 
generally one of victor and vanquished. Parties who resolve a dispute by way of 
mediation may also be more satisfied than parties whose dispute has been 
decided by the court, even if they are the party who succeeded in the court action. 
They may feel that the mediated solution deals with the entire dispute and not 
only the monetary part of it, and that the solution is one which they have reached 
themselves and is agreed to willingly. 
The mediation process may, therefore, give effect to the autonomy of the 
child, his independence and desires, sometimes even more than the legal 
process. The child and parent have a greater ability to shape the decision which 
is ultimately made. Further confrontation between the child and his parent 
within the framework of the legal proceedings may add fuel to the fire of the 
dispute and intensify the damage which already exists. The child may be left 
with monetary compensation, which is not always what he genuinely desires, 
with even deeper psychological scars than existed before the legal proceedings, 
and with further deterioration not only in his relationship with the defendant 
 
not bind the parties, but in many cases is used as a tool to resolve the dispute and achieve agreement 
notwithstanding the high degree of technicality in this process. One of the reasons for this is that in 
this process the parties themselves receive clear information regarding the likelihood of success of 
the claim from an external and independent source, one which is not dependent on the information 
received from the parties’ own attorneys, who may sometimes actually be looking for a legal 
confrontation. See, e.g., N.D. Cal. ADR L.R. 5; Southern District of California's CJRA plan, effective 
January 1, 1992, General Order 394-B, and S.D. Cal. CivLR 16.1(c); U.S. Dist. Ct. (Vt.) LR 16.3; see also 
American Bar Association, Court ADR Template Forms, Brochures, and Resources, available at 
http://www.abanet.org/dispute/bycourtlevel.pdf. 
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parent and the remaining family members, but also in his own psychological 
condition. Notwithstanding its limitations, the law can still use its power and 
authority to promote the resolution of the dispute in a more temperate manner, 
by referring the parties to this course of action prior to dealing with the case on 
the merits. 
The treatment or mediation solution is particularly appropriate according 
to Jewish law, which prefers finding alternative solutions to direct and 
disrespectful confrontations between a child and his parent in the civil courts. In 
fact, mediation, even if in a somewhat different form, is strongly encouraged in 
Jewish law.254 Mediation and treatment also circumvent the problem of making 
the parent swear and testify in court. 
Accordingly, if the court sees a possibility of restoring family harmony, it 
will be able to refer the parties to at least two sessions of an extra-judicial ADR 
process, as a compulsory first step to litigation. Mandating that ADR be used for 
the entire process is not recommended.255 If ADR does not succeed, the case will 
return to the court for a hearing. Indeed, the mediation or treatment process is 
based on agreement, and such agreement must be present in every stage of the 
mediation, including in the referral to it. But in many cases, the primary obstacle 
is the initial mediation hearing, because subsequently, if one or both of the 
parties do not wish to continue, it will not be possible to compel them to do so. 
Usually, the initial refusal will stem from lack of familiarity with the process and 
lack of confidence in its prospects for success. Accordingly, this paper proposes 
that the parties should be compelled to participate in two sessions of an extra-
judicial process and that the judicial proceedings be stayed in the interim. 
During the first session, the mediation or treatment process will be described, 
together with its advantages and the stages comprising it. After the second 
session, a report will be submitted to the court by the therapist or mediator, with 
recommendations concerning further treatment. If there is no point in 
continuing with the process, either because the desired result has not been 
achieved, or because of the vehement objection of one of the parties to 
continuing the process, the court action will continue as usual. 
This proposal balances the individualistic approach and the family 
approach by seeking to incorporate the aims of both. According to this proposal, 
 
 254. Cf. MAIMONIDES, Sanhedrin 22:4, THE CODE OF MAIMONIDES – BOOK FOURTEEN: THE BOOK OF 
JUDGES, 66-67 (Abraham M. Hershman trans., Yale University Press 1949). 
 255. See Note: Mandatory Mediation and Summary Jury Trial: Guidelines for Ensuring Fair and 
Effective Processes, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1086, 1087, 1093 (1990); Developments in the Law – The Paths of 
Civil Litigation: VI. ADR, the Judiciary, and Justice: Coming to Terms with the Alternatives, 113 HARV. L. 
REV. 1851, 1855-57 (2002) (discussing the question of mandating participation in ADR (Alternative 
Dispute Resolution) under the auspices of the court and its advantages and disadvantages). In 
certain American states there is a kind of court-referred mandatory mediation proceeding, both 
under Federal and under state legislation. See Amy M. Pugh & Richard A. Bales, The Inherent Power 
of the Federal Courts to Compel Participation in Nonbinding Forms of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 42 
DUQ. L. REV. 1 (2003); Holly A. Street-Schaefer, A Look at Court Mandated Civil Mediation, 49 DRAKE L. 
REV. 367, 369 (2001); Matthew Parrott, Is Compulsory Court-Annexed Medical Malpractice Arbitration 
Constitutional? How the Debate Reflects a Trend Towards Compulsion in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 75 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2685 (2007); Donna Stienstra, Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998: Seeds of 
Change in the Federal District Courts, http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/ 
KIS_ADRMed_Trends99-00_98ActPub.pdf. 
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the civil claim will be heard by the court. However, if the judge believes that it 
may be possible to restore harmony, he will do everything in his power to 
resolve the dispute by means other than ordinary legal proceedings, including 
referring the parties to the initial mediation sessions by compulsory process. 
4. The Need to Legislate Special “Emotional” Remedies: Apology and 
Expression of Remorse 
Due to the nature of intrafamilial torts, and the fact that the true remedy 
sought in many instances may not be a traditional remedy offered by the law, it is 
possible to legislate suitable remedies for such torts, such as apology and 
expression of remorse. In addition to the existing remedies, these new alternatives 
could serve as tools for the court in considering tort litigation in the family 
framework.256 Thus, there may be room for remedies such as an apology or 
expression of regret. Such remedies may be determined at the conclusion of a 
therapy or mediation process. Or, if the mediation fails and the dispute returns to 
the court, judges should be allowed to conclude such a dispute with a ruling in 
which these alternative forms of relief are awarded, either on their own or in 
conjunction with other remedies. 
On the surface, this appears to be an inappropriate suggestion for the legal 
system. But even for claims between strangers, the law sometimes provides for 
the award of similar remedies.257 Therefore there is no reason to forbid the court 
to impose an apology or expression of regret as a remedy, with the following 
possible applications: (a) a final remedy of an apology, inspired by 
arrangements existing in many countries regarding defamation, in which the 
law provides for the remedy of an apology, correction, or retraction; (b) 
obligating the parent to provide an apology, orally or in writing, even before the 
final judgment in the case; or (c) if the court decides to impose compensation on 
the parent as well, a possible reduction of the compensation award in 
consideration of his sincere apology. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
In this article, emotional neglect has served as a test case for examining tort 
lawsuits against parents in general. 
Modern law is not prepared to impose a positive duty of love on a parent. 
It leaves such a duty to the arena of morality. At most it is willing to examine the 
harm caused to the child as a result of the failure to satisfy his emotional needs, 
and, if it is severe enough, punish the parent in civil court, thus using the 
negative duty not to harm the child as grounds for a tort claim. 
The laws of different nations differ on this issue and in this paper I 
delineated some models for resolving the fundamental dilemma of when to 
allow a child to bring a civil claim against his parent for emotional neglect. Some 
of the models preference the sanctity of the family and grant immunity to the 
parent, creating a special domain for the family which is separate from the 
prevailing law, reflecting the collectivist-family approach. Others tend to the 
 
 256. Their suitability to other types of relationships requires a separate, extensive examination. 
 257. Mostly in cases of libel and slander. 
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opposite extreme, and almost negate any separate arrangement for the family 
unit, as a reflection of an individualistic approach. Still others are lacking due to 
the absence of a clear legal declaration establishing the rights of the child in 
general, and particularly the right not to be neglected emotionally and 
materially. A Jewish religious model embodies a legal declaration which is very 
sweeping and which establishes a positive duty on the parent to love his child. 
However, there is a structural gap between the sweeping declaration and its 
enforcement by human beings. 
The possibility of legal intervention in parent-child relations is certainly a 
blessing, and man’s home should not be his castle whose gates are impermeable 
to the law. However, the character of the family unit requires a special approach 
to be taken. These cases are not only about a “play” in the framework of private 
law in which the actors are solely a tortfeasor and his victim. In this “play” there 
is a third actor, who is of no less consequence than the other two—the family as 
a whole. The best interests of the family unit and the attempt to preserve its 
harmony and restore its peace, even if only a relative peace, must apply when 
determining the appropriate level of legal intervention in parent-child relations. 
The law can and must intervene when an individual’s rights have been 
impaired, particularly when the individual is a child. However, care must be 
taken to ensure that the legal intervention will not turn into a double-edged 
sword, wielded against the family as a whole, including the child. 
This paper proposes a model which tries to walk a golden path between the 
two poles, the first of which negates intervention and the second of which 
supports it, though with an understanding that legal interference within the 
family must be carried out prudently, both in terms of scope and substance. This 
is an integrated model which attempts to adopt the advantages of the prevailing 
models while discarding their disadvantages. 
The essence of the model is the creation of a structured gap between a 
sweeping legal declaration, which imposes a duty on the parent to take into 
account the dignity of the child and his emotional needs and a reasonable 
enforcement of the declaration, in addition to the ability of the courts to turn to 
extra-judicial mechanisms such as mediation or treatment. The model hopes to 
give the child the true remedy he seeks, such as peace-making, or an expression 
of remorse or admission of wrongdoing by the parents. 
The proposal is based on the premise that the family enjoys an important 
status, one which is almost sanctified, both religiously and secularly, and it is 
necessary to do everything possible to minimize harm to it and restore its 
harmony in cases where that harmony has dissipated, while concurrently 
safeguarding the rights of the child in the face of an abusive or neglectful parent. 
It may be that in Western society at the beginning of the 21st century, when the 
status of the traditional family is in sharp decline, this premise is not an obvious 
one. In any event, the family is still the most important unit in society, even if it 
is losing its value or even its values. 
To achieve these goals, this paper has pointed to the fact that modern law 
can join forces with religious legal systems for the purpose of bringing to the 
fore new and creative solutions. 
This paper dealt with parental emotional neglect in the eyes of tort law. 
However, the criteria and proposals can be applied, with the right adjustments, 
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to civil claims by a child against his parent on other grounds, and the proposed 
model can be used in relation to other issues concerning legal intervention in 
parent-child relations which exceed the scope of this paper. 
 
